Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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possible Gennan advance through the province of Limburg. 45 That the Schlieffen plan had
been altered in 1908 was unknown in the Netherlands and in Belgium. 46 The invasion route
that Gennany would use in August 1914 was an alternative that neither neutral envisaged. 47
In the dying days of July, both the Netherlands and Belgium expected that if war broke out
between France and Gennany their neutrality would be violated. 48 At this point (29 July),
the situation looked so grim that the Dutch Foreign Minister, John Loudon, decided to
secretly approach the Belgian Minister in The Hague about sharing military infonnation and
combining defences as soon as Gennany attacked. 49 Such a request was in direct violation
of the neutrality of both countries, although any agreement reached would have only applied
once they were already at war. Presumably because the Belgian government did not wish to
jeopardise its chances and as long as war seemed avoidable, it did not respond immediately
to the Dutch offer. By 2 August, it was too late to do so. Gennany publicly guaranteed it
would respect Dutch neutrality, without doing the same for its other western neighbour. 50
The Dutch turned down all subsequent requests for military aid made by Belgium. 51
On Thursday 30 July, Russia began mobilising. The Netherlands' govennnent
stepped up its preparations. The cabinet's foremost decision was to declare neutrality in the
war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 52 It also imposed a situation of "war danger" on
the country. This set a series of emergency laws into motion: empowering municipalities to
requisition food and accommodation for billeting troops; placing all telephone and
telegraph cOlmnunications under military control; allowing military use of inundations; and,
once mobilisation was declared, giving the Anny right to take-over railway lines and
traffic. 53 The government issued a temporary warning to all anned personnel regarding the
45 See: Map 3, Chapter 1, p. 47.
46 Snijders, "Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 17" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13.
47 Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigdp. 427.
48 Snijders, "Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 17" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13.
49 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tvveede deel p. 5; Hendrik Pruntel, "Bereiken wat mogelijk is:
besluitvorming in de Brits-Nederlandse betrekkingen, 1914 - 1916" [Achieving the possible: decision making in
Anglo-Dutch relations 1914 - 1916] Published PhD. dissertation, Twente University of Technology, 1994, p. 182;
Rob van Vuurde, "Laveren en schipperen achter een fayade van legalisme" [Zigzagging and manoeuvring behind a
fayade oflegalism] in Duco Hellema, Bert Zeeman, Bert van der Zwan (eds.), De Nederlandse ministers van
Buitenlandse Zaken in de twintigste eeuw. Vijfde jam'boek voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse
polWek in de twintigste eeuw. The Hague: SDU, 1999, pp. 72 - 73.
50 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel p. 5; Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" p. 110.
5! Koch, "Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog" pp. 98 - 99.
52 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 6.
53 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden pp. 6 - 8; Treub, Oorlogstijd p. 11.