Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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washed and wearable. The absence of such day-to-day essentials not only undennined troop
morale, and, as a result, their fighting ability, but also made a speedy second mobilisation
highly unlikely.
While neutrality theoretically indicated a time of peace, in reality, the Netherlands
could be likened more closely to a nation at war, but one that did not actually participate in
combat. It had to meet many of the same standards of military preparedness as the
belligerents, in case its neutrality failed, but lacked the urgency that being at war fostered in
the populations and governments of warring states. A belligerent had no choice but to do its
utmost to defend and protect itself since its national existence was at stake. A neutral, on
the other hand, could hide behind its neutrality and put off preparing for war, since the
possibility was not yet a reality. To a certain degree, this is what happened in the
N etherlands. Yet that the government used the extensive powers of the War Law and
imposed military control over three-qualiers of all municipalities, clearly demonstrates that
it was only too well aware that extraordinary times required extraordinary measures, and
that the country's best chance of remaining a non-combatant was to protect its neutrality
exhaustively.
The impact of the war on the domestic economy and the extent of the smuggling
crisis resulted in extensive involvement by the state and the military in the affairs of
citizens. The government imposed the "state of siege" ostensibly to maintain neutrality and
security, stretched its purpose to handle smuggling matters, and ended up committing
military commanders to a variety of municipal concerns. Because the War Law was vague
and largely undefined, its application was limited (it pertained neither to the entire nation
nor to a situation of war), and because it was used for many years and for many different
purposes, it was almost inevitable that judicial concerns arose. From May 1915 onwards,
the High Court made several rulings that changed the use of the "state of war" and "siege"
considerably. The judiciary consistently diluted the principle that nood breekt wet ("need
breaks law"), so that in 1918, commanders had no powers other than those nonnally
allocated to municipal authorities. All the reasons for imposing the "state of war" and
"siege" in the first place, namely protecting neutrality, policing smuggling and improving
defences, were undennined by the judges' decisions. The restrictions placed on the War
Law signalled the ultimate paradox of neutrality: a neutral had a much greater chance of
keeping that status if it had the urgency of a nation at war. lfthe Netherlands had been at