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Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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- 348-<br />

In fact, instead <strong>of</strong> keeping all fortifications fully operational, when l<strong>and</strong>weer troops<br />

went on leave in 1915 <strong>and</strong> 1916, High Comm<strong>and</strong> placed a skeleton l<strong>and</strong> storm staff in most<br />

<strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> fortified positions, except <strong>the</strong> most important ones along <strong>the</strong> New Holl<strong>and</strong> Waterline.<br />

Even in <strong>the</strong> Waterline, garrison numbers were cut: <strong>the</strong> focus had to be on <strong>the</strong> Field Army<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> borders. If a second mobilisation occurred, soldiers would move back into <strong>the</strong><br />

fortifications. In <strong>the</strong> meantime, <strong>the</strong> defences were left virtually unprotected. During periods<br />

<strong>of</strong> crisis, such as <strong>the</strong> Easter scare <strong>of</strong> 1916, more troops occupied <strong>the</strong> fortified positions, but<br />

never enough to make <strong>the</strong>m secure. 56 Of course, decreasing troop strength in <strong>the</strong> fortified<br />

positions made sense, as <strong>the</strong> Army did not have heavy artillery to adequately protect <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

There was ano<strong>the</strong>r major problem with replacing soldiers going on leave with<br />

younger l<strong>and</strong> storm conscripts, namely if <strong>the</strong> war lasted long enough, <strong>the</strong>re would be no<br />

younger replacements available. By <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1917, in fact, l<strong>and</strong>storm substitutes were<br />

older than troops going on leave. For example, military intake year 1909 (men born in<br />

1889) went on leave in November 1916. 57 Four months later, <strong>the</strong> first intake <strong>of</strong> 27-year old<br />

l<strong>and</strong>stormers (LS 1909) began <strong>the</strong>ir military training. When <strong>the</strong> 19081<strong>and</strong>storm intake was<br />

called up later in 1917, its soldiers were older (29 years old in 1917) than <strong>the</strong> four military<br />

intakes that went on leave that year (1911 (26 years old), 1912 (25 years old), 1913 (24<br />

years.old), <strong>and</strong> 1914 (23 years old)). The 30-year threshold for l<strong>and</strong> storm duty had nearly<br />

been reached. If High Comm<strong>and</strong> was to allow more troops to go on leave, o<strong>the</strong>r sources had<br />

to be found. Throughout 1918, instead <strong>of</strong> calling up older l<strong>and</strong>storm conscripts, <strong>the</strong><br />

government recalled to military inspections, those men freed in <strong>the</strong> first l<strong>and</strong> storm call_up.58<br />

Snijders also suggested calling up <strong>the</strong> military intake year 1919 six months early (in <strong>the</strong><br />

middle <strong>of</strong> 1918); as a result, <strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1919 intake took up posts in training<br />

barracks in August <strong>of</strong> that year. 59 He floated <strong>the</strong> idea to recall intake year 1914 from<br />

indefinite leave as well. 60<br />

56 For fluctuations <strong>of</strong> troops in <strong>the</strong> New Holl<strong>and</strong> Waterline during <strong>the</strong> war see: Koen, Utrecht Verdedigd pp. 38 - 40.<br />

See also: Hoogterp, "De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor" p. 28.<br />

57 See: Appendix 10, p. 463.<br />

58 Staatsblad. no. 257, 20 April 1918.<br />

59 Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-Chiefto military authorities, 21 February 1918, in SMGIDC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13.<br />

60 Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-Chiefto Minister <strong>of</strong> War, 23 October 1918, in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13.

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