Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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where departing ships' contents could be inspected, Rotterdam's trade could be checked
elsewhere, so the request was unequivocally denied. 68
WHO HAS THE JURISDICTION TO Do WHAT?
While the reasons for imposing the "state of siege" varied considerably, a
reflection of the different emergency situations facing the nation during the war, the actual
powers assigned to the anned forces in the "state of war" and, especially, the "state of
siege" were sweeping and remained largely undefined. Because the War Law existed to deal
with every possible contingency, it did not explain how the "state of war" or "siege" should
be administered or used. In its indetenninate nature lay the roots of substantial problems,
since the legislation failed to address any practical consequences that inevitably arose. For
example, the law did not define where civilian authority stopped and military authority
started, or even if in the "state of siege" local government continued to exist or operate at
al1. 69 How the two authorities were to consult each other in the "state of war" was not
addressed either, let alone what should happen when they disagreed. 70 It was impossible, if
not ludicrous, to suspend the nonnal workings of local govemment and administration in
the "state of war" and "siege" indefinitely, yet how municipal bodies should interact with
military authOlities remained entirely a mystery.71
Of course, in the first months of war, the authorities could easily ignore any
problems with the War Law. People believed the war would be over by Christmas, and thus
a temporary suspension of nornlality was largely expected. By late 1914, however, they
could no longer neglect the excesses and contradictions occurring in the "state of war" and
"siege". Many now recognised that the war had no foreseeable end and that the Netherlands
would have to safeguard its neutrality indefinitely. The reasons behind the "state of war"
and "siege" declarations still existed, and, during 1915, other neutrality concerns arose that
made the use of the "state of siege" even more appropriate. It was imperative, therefore, that
68 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 5 October 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no.
2.13.70, inventory no. 1.
69 See: Article 10 and 22 of the War Law in Appendix 8, p. 459.
70 Tuinen et. a!., "Ret militair gezag" p. 274.
71 J. A. Eigeman, "De bevoegdheid van het militair gezag in geval van oOl'log of andere buitengewone
omstandigheden" [The power of military authority in case of war or other extraordinary circumstances] Orgaan van
de Koninklijke Vereeniging fer Beoejenillg vall de Krijgswefenschap. 1913 - 1914, p. 121; Rasselton, "De wisseling
van het opperbevel" p. 11.