Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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the cabinet and Snijders. The first related to the issue of leave. Snijders was far from keen
to reinstate nonnalleave so quickly after having removed it on 23 October. He thought
conscripts would interpret it as giving in to their demands, and thereby legitimising future
riots. Yet on 31 October, he nonetheless conceded, granting leave to all regiments except
those involved in any of the riotous outbreaks, and rationalising the move in tenns of the
likelihood of an annistice being signed before 10ng. 31 Politicians, especially from the SDAP
benches, widely criticised his decision to deny leave to regiments involved in the riots.
Continued pressure from the government to punish only the instigators of the troublesome
events, forced Snijders to capitulate again on 5 November?2
The second area of conflict involved the scope of investigations into the riots.
Already on 27 October, Snijders decided to send investigators to Harskamp,33 who reported
back six days later. 34 The government was not content to leave the matter to the military
(which it had done in previous cases) and launched its own commission of enquiry, to
discover whether "our troops are sufficiently trustwOlihy and in control of their
commanders, '" [and able] ... to co-operate in the defence of our territory and the
maintenance of neutrality". 35 Snijders was not unduly concerned about the decision, but was
annoyed to find out about it through the newspapers, and decidedly livid about the
appointment offonner Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, as chief commissioner. 36 De Jonge
had been at the heart of Snijders' problems with the previous cabinet in April 1918, and
there was little love lost between the two men. 37 He felt that the new govermnent must have
little respect for his position, let alone for his public persona, if it was willing to attract
31 Commander-in-Chiefto Minister of War, 30 October 1918, Commander-in-Chiefto all Army and Navy authorities,
31 October 1918, both in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.l3.70, inventory no. 698.
32 Commander-in-Chiefto all Army authorities, 5 November 1918, ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no.
2.l3.70, inventory no. 698. For further details of the leave situation in the wake of Harskamp see: Berg, Camelis
Jacobus Sl1ijders pp. 112 - 114.
33 Commander-in-Chiefto Commander of the Field Army, 27 October 1918, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.l3.16, inventory no. 325.
34 "Rapport van de Commissie tot onderzoek van de ongeregeldheden in de Legerplaats bij Harskamp, ingesteld
ingevolge aanschrijving van den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en Zeemacht van 27 October 1918, Afd. G. S. No.
20827 Geheim" 2 November 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
35 "[O]f onze troepen nog weI voldoende betrouwbaar en in de hand hunner aanvoerders zijn, ... [en bel'eid zijn] ...
tot verdediging van ons grondgebied en tot handhaving del' neutraliteit" (Minister of War, 4 November 1918, in
SMG/DC, "Verslag van de Commissie tot onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid in het Leger. Alg. Landsdrukkerij,
1919" p. 2, 91A1-).
36 Commander-in-Chiefto Minister of War, 4 November 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no.
2.l3.70, inventory no. 5.
37 See: pp. 410 - 42Lbelow.