Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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dangerous conditions. 6s The value of properly-supported trenches became a priority as well,
resulting in greater emphasis on pioneer troops and imitation of Gennan trenches, the Dutch
experimenting with concrete bunkers in an around Utrecht. 66 Developments in aerial
warfare also inspired the creation of a lltchtafweerafdeling (air defence section) within the
Anny, which tried to make maximum use of the few anti-aircraft guns available. 67
Likewise, in 1916, the use of new infantry mortar bombs by the combatants, resulted in
High Command requesting plans for improving fortification and trench defences against
such a threat. 68
Despite its efforts, the Netherlands was helpless in trying to keep up with war
developments. The country did not have the resources, finances and access to expertise
available to the warring nations. In this respect, it was truly stuck between the devil and the
deep blue sea. The equipment it did receive from the belligerents (especially Great Britain
in 1918), while significant for the improvement of the Anny, did not appreciably close the
widening gap between the neutral anned forces and those of nations they could conceivably
be forced to fight.
FOOD, FUELS AND RATIONING
The supply crisis was as much a civilian problem as a military one, especially
when it came to such necessities as foodstuffs and fuels. Despite a strong agricultural base,
the Netherlands was not self-sufficient and relied on imports of many essentials, including
grain and coal. The country was always going to have problems obtaining these necessities
from warring states. Yet, at the outbreak of war, and much like Britain's "business as usual"
policy,69 the government did not wish to interfere unduly in the economy?O It had never
regulated the economy before, and saw no urgent need to do so after August 1914. 71
65 For information about the formation of stormtroepen sections in the Netherlands' Army see: ARA, "Archieven van
de Generale Staf" entry no. 2.13 .70, inventory no. 660.
66 Koen, Utrecht Verdedigd p. 25.
67 W. E. Stoorvogel, "Het Nederlandsche afweergeschut gedurende de mobilisatie 1914 - 1918" [Dutch anti-aircraft
fire during the mobilisation] in Kooiman (ed.), De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht pp. 466 - 468.
68 S. H. Hoogterp, "De geschiedenis van Fort Spijkerboor" [The history of Fort Spijkerboor] Nederlandse Historien.
20, no. 5/6, November 1986, p. 28.
69 Bond, War and Society p. 108.
70 Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, p. 251.
71 J. J. Woltjer, Recent VerI eden. De Geschiedenis van Nederland in de Twintigste Eel/w. [Recent past. The history of
the Netherlands in the twentieth century] Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 1992,p. 19 ..