Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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The demobilisation lobby, which had pestered the govermnent for a substantial
decrease in military commitment since October 1914, now enjoyed the upper hand. 104 On
numerous occasions, the public and parliamentarians called for partial demobilisation for a
number of reasons: financial gain, economic necessity and social good. 105 No doubt, the
financial strains of mobilisation were immense. Likewise, it removed thousands of men
from the workforce, contributing to the economic instability created by the crisis situation.
Although a less tangible reason than the economic factors, another key reason why the
demobilisation campaign received so much support was its impact on family life.
Inevitably, removing men from families for considerable periods at a time had many
stressful consequences for relationships, the position of women in households and the
upbringing of children. While the removal of soldiers from their families would have been
accepted if the countly was at war, neutrality defence was not deemed important enough to
warrant it for too long.
The demobilisation lobbyists in parliament also used examples of other neutral
nations to argue that the govemment's stand was extraordinary and inappropriate. Both
Switzerland and Demnark, two neutral countries bordering the belligerents, had cut their
mobilisation commitment after the first few months of war. For example, of the 350,000
Swiss troops placed on alert in August 1914, only 150,000 remained mobilised by the end
of that year. 106 Many parliamentarians asked:. if it was possible for these two neutrals to
scale down the security risk, why should the Netherlands keep it so high?107 The Minister of
War answered these questions by highlighting the differences in the security position of the
two neutral nations and the Netherlands. 108 Neither Denmark nor Switzerland had as close a
proximity to the Westem Front. Although it was conceivable that Swiss territory could be in
danger of invasion or a German retreat, given its mountainous terrain, this was highly
unlikely. Dutch territory on the other hand, was far more likely to be crossed during a
104 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandiglzeden p. 271.
105 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel pp. 26 - 31; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden
pp. 271 - 300.
106 "Voorlopig verslag" 21 December 1914, Handelingen derStaten-Generaal. T,veede Kamer. Bijlagen. 1914-
1915 no. 261, 4, p. 3; Minister of Foreign Affairs to H. P. Marchant (Member of Parliament), 27 October 1915, in
ARA, "Papieren van mI'. H. P. Marchant" [Papers ofmr H. P. Marchant] entry no. 2.21.117, inventory no. 314.
107 "Voorlopig verslag" 21 December 1914, Handelingen der Staten-Generaal. Tweede Kamer. Bijlagen. 1914-
1915 no. 261, 4, p. 3.
108 "Nota naar aanleiding van het voorlopig verslag" [Note regarding the temporary report] 9 January 1915,
Handelillgen derStaten-Generaal. Tweede Kamer. Bijlagell. 1914 -1915 no. 261,8, pp. 11 - 12.