Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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phase would be the transfer of the Field Army from its afivachtingsopstelling to its war
position. Once general mobilisation was declared, it was intended that troops, their horses,
equipment and food supplies would be fully war ready within three days. Within this time,
garrison troops were also to prepare fOliresses and inundations. Speed was essential. The
entire mobilisation process was intended to be quick, centralised, flexible and efficient. 92
By sunrise on the first mobilisation day - Saturday 1 August - the military
undertaking was well under way. Men, dressed in unifonns retrieved from drawers, attics
and moth cupboards, made their way to local depots or train stations. Soldiers seemed to be
present everywhere. 93 Although severallandweer troops mobilised locally, most soldiers
had to travel by rail to get to their depots or cifwachtingsopstelling. On 30 July,
responsibility for rail traffic transferred from the rail companies to the (military) Director of
Supply and Traffic, although the individual companies remained responsible for the daily
operation of trains, carriages and tracks. 94 In 1912, within the General Staff an Office for
Extraordinary Transport had been created to ease the transition from civilian to militmy
control over the railways.95 The bureau moved all military troops, their goods and horses
during mobilisation and fulfilled an impOliant liaison role between the military and rail
companies. 96 They ensured that an additional 144 trains were operational on 1 August, and
that 241 nonnal trains were lengthened. 97 That day, around 97,000 soldiers and officers
used trains to reach their destinations alongside nearly 2,000 horses, 21 gun and
ammunition wagons, and six vehicles. The next day another 72,000 men were transported,
this time accompanied by nearly 4,500 horses, 85 gun and ammunition wagons, and 293
vehicles. 98 By the morning of 4 August, the railways had carried 177,500 military
personnel, 6,600 horses and 472 vehicles. 99
92 Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 441; Schulten, "Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap" p. 3; Klinkert, Het
Vader/and Verdedigd p. 399.
93 Schilpevoort, Vit Kazerne en Kamp no page number.
94 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 6.
95 Klinkert, Het Vader/and Verdedigd p. 399.
96 A. P. Seyffardt, "Ons spoorwegbedrijf en de mobilisatie" [Our rail industry and the mobilisation] in Kooiman (ed.),
De Neder/andsche Strijdmacht p. 475.
97 "Schets voor het, door het Departement van OorIog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13, no page numbers, section "Hoofdstuk II. De mobilisatie. B. Buitengewoon militair
vervoer".
98 Ibid.
99 Snijders, "Twee mobilisatien" p. 18.