Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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invaders. The inundations were regulated from the New Holland Waterline, Fortress
Holland's first defensive line in the east.
The Netherlands' geography provided another major dilelmna for strategists. The
provinces of Limburg and Zeeland, both of great interest to Germany, Britain and Belgium,
were virtually impossible to defend. At the foot of the country, Limburg jutted out like a
land peninsula into Belgium and Gennany. For the strategist, the entire province was too
thin, too flat and too long. An invader could easily cut off troops stationed in the province
from the rest of the country. Defence was further complicated by the Maas River, which ran
along the Belgian border seemingly slicing Limburg from the rest of the Netherlands. As a
result, the strategic directives allocated only token defence to Limburg: enough troops to
blow up bridges, protect borders and make any advance through the slender territory
difficult. Yet this paper-thin bulwark was absolutely necessary to deter Gennany (the major
benefactor of the Limburg route) from invading, and to convince other nations, especially
Britain and Belgium, that the Dutch would protect their territorial integrity.4
In the decade before the war, Gennany also put pressure on the Netherlands to
ensure that Zeeland and the mouths of the Schelde were adequately protected. The province
consisted of a series of islands, split from each other by river tributaries and sea inlets. Like
Limburg, troops stationed in Zeeland could easily be isolated from the rest of the country.
Here again, High Command allocated a token force. Using warships to cut off the river
mouths was another option, but the Netherlands' Navy was not large enough to meet a
concerted attack by either the British Royal Navy or the Gennan Imperial fleet. An option
considered in 1910, amid much international controversy, involved constructing a strong
fortified position at Vlissingen (Flushing). 5 Britain, Belgium and France accused the
Netherlands of giving in to Gennan pressure on the matter, implying neglect of neutrality
were the nation to go ahead with its plans. In the end, although foundations were laid, the
project was abandoned. While artillery pieces destined for Vlissingen were ordered from
4 Hubeti van Tuyll came to a similar conclusion (Tuyll, "The Dutch Mobilization" p. 732).
5 For further information about the proposed Vlissingen fortification and its ultimate failure see: I. L. Uijterschout,
Beknopt Overzicht van de Belangrijkste Gebeurtenissen uit de Nederlandsche Krijgsgeschiedenis van 1568 tot
Hedel1. [Brief overview of the most important events in Dutch military history 1568 to today] The Hague: De
Gebroeders van Cleef, 1935, p. 441; Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy pp. 105 -107; Smit, Nederland in de
Eerste Wereldoorlog. Eerste deel pp. 173 - 183; Thomas, The Guarantee of Belgian Independence pp. 469, 473;
Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" pp. 83 - 90; Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd pp. 399,439 - 460; Ferguson, The Pity of
War p. 67; Cees Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Dejonge koningin. [Wilhelmina. The young queen] Amsterdam: Uitgeverij
Balans, 1998, pp. 443- 445; Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 33 - 34.