Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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Once the war did not end by Christmas 1914, as many expected and hoped,
neutrality began to take precedence over defence. The growing number of neutrality
responsibilities assigned to the armed forces resulted not only in the dilution of the Field
Army's military capacities, but also led to the siphoning off of garrison troops from
fortified positions to border areas. While it was only natural that neutrality held primary
place of importance in military strategy, since its careful preservation ensured that
ultimately the armed forces would not need to face invasion by a superior force, the
overwhelming emphasis on neutrality came at the expense of the country's defence
capabilities and further devalued the worth of military deterrence.
NEUTRALITY OR DEFENCE?
Within days of mobilising into their afwachtingsopstelling (waiting position) in
August 1914,4 High Command moved the four Field Army divisions to meet perceived
threats to security and neutrality. After the Gennan invasion of Belgium on 4 August, Field
Anny headquarters shifted closer to the south from The Hague to's Heliogenbosch, and
Division N, situated in the middle of the country, also moved to North Brabant around the
city of Tilburg. 5 The fighting in Belgium led High Command to consider an attack on the
Netherlands from that direction, or an accidental crossing of foreign troops into the country,
very real possibilities. When the Cavalry Brigade assembled on 8 August, three of its
regiments moved southwards as well, joining Division III near Eindhoven. 6 At this time,
Snijders officially assigned responsibility for neutrality matters along the southern border to
Buhlman, the Commander of the Field Anny.7 Two months later, Snijders and Buhlman
reacted to the Gennan siege of Antwerp by shifting much of the Field Army further south­
west: headquarters moved to Oosterhout, more troops diverted into Zeeland, and the whole
of Brigade X (Division I) left Haarlem for Alkmaar. 8 This weakened Division 1's strength
on the coast by one-third, and made the country more vulnerable to an attack from the sea.
4 See: Map 7, Chapter 2, p. 8l.
5 Commander-in-Chiefto Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no.
2.l3.70, inventory no. 2; Klinkert, "De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914" p. 3l.
6 Voorst tot Voorst, "Onze cavalerie tijdens de mobilisatie" pp. 428, 432, 437.
7 Commander-in-Chief, "Bijzonder Instructie voor den Commandant van het Veldleger geldende van 10 Augustus
1914 tot nadere kennisgeving" 10 August 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70,
inventory no. 1.
8 Commander-in-Chiefto Minister President, 22 February 1915, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no.
2.l3.70, inventory no. 2; Klinkert, "Verdediging van de zuidgrens" p. 215.