Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

- 401 -
Maas and Rhine; ready bases for aerial patrols over Gennan ten'itory; and an additional 200
miles of largely undefended frontline, allowing the Allies to overrun the Gennan Reich
quickly.4 In the end, only the dissenting voices of Royal Navy representatives, who did not
wish to patrol more coastlines and did not see any particular benefit for the Navy, prevented
the proposal from being pursued further. 5
At first, the Dutch authorities saw the possibility of Gennan defeat in a positive
light. Neutrality could be assured if an annistice was signed. Yet the movement on the
fighting front in Belgium brought renewed neutrality anxieties. The country might still enter
the conflict due to the mismanagement of its own security measures. The possibility of
another internee crisis loomed large. It was all too probable that the Gennans would enter
Dutch territory, especially in Limburg, in order to reach home soil, since the Belgian­
Gennan border was not wide enough to handle a large-scale German retreat. The retreating
soldiers would have to be interned. Another key concern was the growing likelihood of the
Allies following the retreating Germans into Limburg. 6 Given that, throughout October,
tens of thousands of French and Belgian refugees sought refuge in the Netherlands, the
Army was always going to be stretched. The possible recapture of Antwerp by the Allies
posed potential problems as well, especially if the Allies sailed shipments of war materials
on the Schelde? Vigilance on the borders and in the ports had to be raised.
HARSKAMP
On 8 October, High Command told troops in Zeeland that their leave was
suspended due to the proximity of fighting on the Western Front. For the same reason,
within a fortnight, it removed leave for soldiers in Limburg and NOlih Brabant. On 23
October, the govennnent decided to cancel leave for all military personnel. Everything
possible had to be done to keep the Netherlands entirely neutral. In fact, on 22 October,
Snijders told van Terwisga that Field Army involvement in helping refugees - officially a
civilian responsibility - had to be kept at a minimum since a second mobilisation could be
4 Sanders, "The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning" p. 261; Watson, "Britain's Dutch Policy" p. 213.
5 Watson, "Britain's Dutch Policy" p. 213.
6 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 243, 246 -247.
7 "Nota van de eerste afdeling van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken voor Zijne Excellentie" [Note from the first
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to his Excellency [the Minister of Foreign Affairs]] 25 October 1918,
Smit (ed.), Bescheiden betrejJende de buitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 -
1919. Vij/de Dee11917 -1919. Tweede Stukpp. 694 - 695.