Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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that a Dutch-Gennan conflict would leave large parts of the country in Gennan hands. 22 Not
long after, he explained that if Britain attacked, it "would be advisable ... to accept aid from
Gennan forces and to arrange possible consultation with each other".23 On neither occasion
did he advocate that the country should renege on its neutrality and join one of the warring
parties, as some historians have professed. 24 Snijders wanted what was best for the
Netherlands' continued independence. However, if war became unavoidable, he did seek
alternative plans, and hoped the government would agree to join either the Allied or Central
Powers' camps. Otherwise, a war on two fronts "would have the unavoidable consequence
of the loss of our country and destruction of our independent existence". 25
But on each occasion, the cabinet's response was the same: remain neutral and
repel every breach of territory with all available military means, regardless of
circumstance. 26 James Porter has ably outlined why the government held steadfastly to this
policy of strict military neutrality?7 After the fall of Antwerp, there was a discussion among
cabinet ministers about what the country should do now that Gennany controlled the
eastern and southern borders. Some members, including Bosboom and J. J. Rambomlet, the
Minister in Charge of the Navy, claimed that the Netherlands should improve its
relationship with Britain to counter the threat now posed by Gennany on two borders. Other
ministers were more inclined to negotiate with Germany. Only a few chose to remain
completely impartial, arguing for strict neutrality to avoid angering either power. They did
not manage to reach consensus. Because the Commander-in-Chiefhad to act according to
22 Commander-in-Chief, "Nota over den militairen toestand van Nederland" [Note about the military situation of the
Netherlands] 29 May 1918; Commander-in-Chief, "Strategische beschouwingen over de verdediging van Nederland"
[Strategic viewpoints about the defence ofthe Netherlands] 13 June 1918, both in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale
Staf" entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
23 "Ret zal dam'om geraden zijn, indien de Entente-aanval van ernstigen aard is ... de samenwerking met de Duitsche
hulpkrachten te aanvaardigen en in onderling overleg te regelen." (Commander-in-Chief, "Strategische bescheidenen
over de verdediging van Nederland" 1 ° July 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70,
inventory no. 5).
24 For more on Snijders' German allegiance and problems with the Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, in 1918, see:
Chapter 12, pp. 410 - 417.
25 "[E]en oorlog naar twee zijden ... zou onvermijdelijk tot het veri oren gaan van ons land en vernietiging van ons
zelfstandig volksbestaan" (Commander-in-Chief, "Strategische bescheiden over de verdediging van Nederland" 10
July 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).
26 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 26 February 1915, ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no.
2.13.70, inventory no. 2.
27 Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" pp. 119 - 124.