Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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On 30 March 1916, Gennan officials in Berlin infonned a Dutch diplomatic
representative there that they had reliable information regarding a pending British attack on
German-occupied Belgium after an amphibious landing on the banks of the Schelde River.
Gennany demanded that the Netherlands take necessary military action to prevent an
invasion of Zeeland. 81 When this news reached the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War,
they faced a difficult decision. Neither believed the Gemlan report was COlTect - Britain had
shown no indication of going to war with the Netherlands in previous months - and both
agreed that Gennany intended to test the bounds of Dutch neutrality, especially in the wake
of the Tubantia sinking a fortnight earlier. 82 If the Gennan claim was true, however (which
was remotely possible given the Dutch knew about a plan for a full-scale attack on the
Gennan lines that had been recently discussed at an inter-Allied conference in Paris), the
country would be in dire straits. 83 After consulting with Snij ders and the rest of the cabinet,
Bosboom told Snijders to cancel all leave as of 31 March until the crisis simmered down or
the report proved false. 84 The COlmnander-in-Chief also delayed the sailing of the newly­
built cruiser Noord Brabant to the East Indies until further notice. 85
Although the potential threat was not deemed high enough to remobilise soldiers,
the cancellation ofleave caused great excitement in the country.86 At first, wild rumours
filled the newspapers about possible dangers, followed within days by stories blaming High
Command for forcing the govemment to cancel leave without good reason. The press
quickly cast the General Staff as villains using a ruse to stir the population into a frenzy, so
that mobilisation could continue, while criticising the govermnent for not explaining the
sudden cancellation of leave. 87 In response to the uproar, which even emanated from the
more govemment-friendly newspapers, the cabinet issued a statement on 4 April, in which
81 Dutch Minister in Berlin to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 March 1916, in Smit (ed.), Bescheiden
betrefJende de bllitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919. Vierde Deel1914 -
1917 p. 536.
82 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 159 - 160.
83 Watson, "Britain's Dutch Policy" pp. 54 - 55.
84 For a good overview of the leave crisis in March and April 1916 see: Snijders, "Mobilisatie - Herinneringen 1914
-1918. No. 17" pp. 4 - 5, in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3; Bosboom, III Moeilijke Omstandigheden pp. 264
- 270; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 1, pp. 5 - 26; Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoa rlog. Tweede deel pp.
110-117.
85 Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, p. 17.
86 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede deel p. 111.
87 Commander-in-Chief, "Bericht van het Algemeen Hoofdkwartier" [Announcement from General Headquarters] 28
April 1916, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 299.