Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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rest were all on indefinite leave. Of these 200,000 mobilised individuals, more than one­
half were away on some fonn of short-term tenn leave. About 80,000 troops remained, far
from enough to give any concern to either Gennany or Great Britain. The Netherlands
required a comprehensive second mobilisation if it was to have any chance of meeting an
invasion. The tragedy was that if one of its neighbours attacked, it would most likely not
have time for such a remobilisation to succeed.
Throughout the last eleven months of the Great War, the country faced an
increasingly hostile and unco-operative international arena and a national environment
filled with weariness. Although the country stayed out of the conflict, this can be attributed
more to the decisions of other states than to the Netherlands' own military resourcefulness.
Of course, any discussion about the actual quality of the Netherlands' Army compared to
those in the belligerent countries remains highly speculative, since the Dutch Army, Navy
or Air Branch were not tested in a combat situation between 1914 and 1918. Yet even
though the Dutch did not fight during the Great War, the war significantly altered the
quality and wOlih of their fighting forces.
The 200,000 troops mobilised in 1914 were, despite many inadequacies,
comparatively much stronger than the force of 400,000 soldiers available for battle in
November 1918. 127 The difference was due to many factors outside Dutch control­
industrial weakness and the inability to obtain supplies from 1916 onwards. But the
inherent technological disadvantage worsened through the forced dispersal of the Field
Anny throughout the country, the obsolescence of fortifications, the large number of troops
allowed to go on leave, and the lack of extra-govermnental political support for military
improvements. Part of the problem was that not enough had been done before 1914 to
ensure that the necessary processes were in place to be able to improve and augment the
anned forces in wartime. 128 A certain amount of responsibility, therefore, must lie with
those who resourced and sUPPOlied the Army, Navy and Air Branch. Neveliheless, it is
highly unlikely that even if the structures and support had been in place before and during
the war, the Dutch could have kept up with the warring states. Such was the nature of
modern war.
127 F. Snapper reached a similar conclusion ("De gevechtswaarde" pp. 32 - 34, 46).
128 Commander of the Field Army to Minister of War, 20 October 1919, p. 14, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale
Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 881; Berg, Camelis Jacobus Sllijders p. 141.