Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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months earlier when he proclaimed that defence against a full-scale German invasion would
be "pointless", as the Netherlands' Army did not have the weapons, ammunition, training or
size to withstand such an attack. The outburst lost the Commander-in-Chief much respect
among government ministers, many of whom censured Snijders' defeatism and believed
him unworthy of the burden of command.
It must be said, however, that the nature of the war crisis made it almost
impossible to ensure uniformity in production or regularity in importation of war materials.
Despite the restrictions, High Command did its best to ensure production levels remained
high. Military factories were exempted from eight-hour days, received priority in coal
supplies, and had strikes quashed by armed soldiers. The munitions factories in Delft and
Hembrug even had 2,000 troops assigned, organised into a special "workers' company"
(werkliedencompagnie)?16 But, since the nation was in crisis, it was impossible for military
production not to be in crisis as well. More could have been done to streamline production
and supply processes, but essentially, the problem had more to do with lack of resources
than deficiencies in organisation. Hence, maintaining technological parity with the warring
states ultimately became an unattainable goal, even if the Netherlands had been the most
organised of countries.
Therefore, Amry Vandenbosch's claim that small states have been decidedly
disadvantaged by developments in modern technology ever since the start ofthe Great War
certainly rings true for the Netherlands. 217 It could not afford new armaments, not
necessarily because it did not have the financial means to acquire them, but because it did
not have the industrial capacity to build, supply, support and develop them. Without
industrially powerful allies, a small neutral country could not progress militarily on equal
terms with the major powers. Whereas before 1914, the Netherlands' Army was comparable
to the French, German and British armies in composition and weaponry (although on a
much smaller scale), by 1918, it was outclassed in strength, size and, most of all,
technological capability.
216 Minister of War, "Nota omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang der mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de
gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting hiervan te verhoogen" [Note regarding what has been done since the start ofthe
mobilisation to increase the fighting strength and equipment of the Army] 16 January 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van
de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 705; Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 145.
217 Vandenbosch, "The small states" p. 294.