Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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more decisively, a suggestion that was not taken up by the Commander-in-Chief. 114 What
perturbed Snijders and his colleagues most was that the appearance of these radical
mobilisation clubs would contribute to the outbreak of general disorder. It seemed too much
of a coincidence, for example, that the emergence of clubs concurred with the militmy riots
in 1915. While in one or two instances, the organisations may have been involved in
disturbances, there is no evidence to suggest that their activities were a root cause of the
riots. In fact, in most cases, no evidence of possible involvement could be found at all. 115
What is more likely, is that rather than being the catalyst for agitation and unrest, the
mobilisation clubs were another symptom and signal of widespread frustration among
troops.
The actions of the authorities against the clubs were relatively unsuccessful. While
ensuring the temporary disintegration of certain groups, socialist mobilisation clubs
continued to exist in one fonn or another right up until the end of the war. They became
more clandestine in their activities, and shrewd in propagating infonnation among soldiers.
They also became better organised. In 1916, the SDAP clubs in the provinces of North and
South Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland merged together to fonn the Vereeniging van
Sociaal-Democratische Mobilisatieclubs (Association of Social-Democratic Mobilisation
Clubs), which would be joined in 1917 by similar organisations in the southern
provinces. I 16 It is only in 1918, that the radical clubs reappear in the documents of the
General Staff. This time, a distinct split can be discerned within the radical movement
between those who supported the SDP, the So Ida ten-Raden (Soldier Councils, SR), and the
even more secretive Raden van Arbeiders en Soldaten (Councils of Workers and Soldiers,
SAR), whose leadership resided in Amsterdam. I 17 The SR and SAR operated independently
of each other, although they had parallel ends, nmnely revolution and the overthrow of the
constitution by undermining the military as an instrument of state. The difference between
114 Commander Depot Battalion 9 lB, 30 September 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no.
2.13.70, inventory no. 147.
115 Except in Tilburg, where a radical mobilisation club (not involving the SDAP affiliation) petitioned the
Commander-in-Chiefabout their conditions a week before the August riots (see: Head of Commission, Major G. C.
A. Fabius, "Rapport del' Commissie tot instellen van een onderzoek naar de oorzaken del' ongeregeldheden te Tilburg
op 1 en 2 Augustus 1915" 11 August 1918, pp. 6 -7 and Appendix, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 282). Yet even here there is little evidence to suggest that the petition or
action by the club sparked the riots.
116 Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg pp. 122 - 123.
117 Attorney General, Director of the Police to the Minister of Justice, 28 October 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de
Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.