Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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traditions of cifZijdigheid (remaining aloof) in international affairs and reflected general
public opinion about the role of the country in the world.
Of course, the desire of the Dutch to stay neutral mattered little if any of the great
powers had sought to capture the Netherlands. In other words, the third and undoubtedly
most important reason for the survival of Dutch neutrality was that it depended on the will
of stronger states. Germany could easily have crossed through Dutch territory on its way to
France, as it did to Belgium and Luxembourg during the night of 3 and 4 August 1914. The
Netherlands, while it had an army of significant size (200,000 soldiers mobilised on 1
August 1914), could not prevent or halt a concerted attack by the large conscript armies of
Gennany or France, or even Great Britain's well-equipped and properly-trained volunteer
force - a true reflection of the Netherlands' small power status. Yet both the Central and
Allied powers had distinct interests at stake in Dutch neutrality and feared occupation of the
territory by their opponents above all. Keeping the Netherlands non-belligerent prevented
the warring sides from capitalising on the strategic, economic and territorial advantages
capture of the country may have given, but it also kept these advantages from their enemies.
Where Chapter 1 gives the contextual background to Dutch neutrality on the eve of
the Great War, Chapter 2 provides a similar analysis for the Dutch armed forces. It provides
an overview of the make-up of the Anny, Navy and fledgling Air Force in 1914, and
illustrates how each was expected to protect the nation if invasion came. In tum, the chapter
functions as an essential introduction to the problems involved in upholding neutrality
regulations as well as maintaining defensive capabilities. It also provides context to later
discussions on the relative value of mobilisation and defence, the complexities of
supporting a conscript army during more than four years of crisis, and the problems
associated with modernising the military to maintain parity with warring states. The chapter
highlights a recurring theme, namely, that the viability of the armed forces was central to
the viability of the country's neutrality.
Chapter 3 addresses the "mobilisation days" of late July and early August 1914 and
looks at how the Dutch prepared for war and neutrality, the importance of the "Api Api"
telegram in aiding these preparations, as well as civilian responses to the mobilisation. The
mobilisation itself is analysed in terms of its relative military worth. The inadequacies of
mobilisation are highlighted since they affected the ability of the armed forces to fulfil their
neutrality obligations during the years of conflict ahead.