Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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outcome of the war. 96 The Allies wanted river access to Antwerp (and the Western Front),
while Gennany could have used the Schelde to send U-boats into the English Channel. The
importance of the river for Britain can be easily ascertained from Winston Churchill's
statement in 1911, that Britain:
should be prepared at the proper moment to put extreme pressure on the Dutch
to keep the ScheIdt open for all purposes. If the Dutch close the ScheIdt, we
should retaliate by a blockade of the Rhine. 97
This was a primary reason why Churchill, with support from others in the British
Admiralty, pushed for an Allied assault on the river early in 1915 (as an alternative to the
Gallipoli campaign).98 In the end, the possibility that Allied forces would not be successful
in capturing the Netherlands after a concerted Gennan counter-offensive, and the perceived
advantages of a campaign in the Dardanelles, shifted Allied attention away from the
Schelde. 99
The river Eems (marking the northern border between the Netherlands and
Gennany) did not attract the same amount of international controversy as the Schelde,
although it remained a continual problem for Dutch-Gennan relations. Officially, the
Netherlands and Gennany each claimed sovereignty over the river, but effectively, the
Dutch were unable to exercise any control over their half. The two neighbours had disputed
the others' right to the Eems for many years. 100 Rather than antagonise Gennany at the start
of the war, the Dutch government decided to let Germany use the river at will. As COli van
del' Linden pointed out to Snijders, there was no point in going to war over the Eems. 101
There was considerable fear among cabinet members that Gennany needed the river so
desperately - to move its naval ships into the Nmih Sea - that it would have declared war if
the Netherlands tried to challenge this right. 102 Since the Dutch did not exercise sovereignty
96 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands p. 39.
97 Winston Churchill to Sir Edward Grey, 30 August 1911, in Winston Churchill, The World Crisis. 1911 -1918.
London: Landsborough Publications, 192311960, pp. 52 - 53.
98 Sanders, "The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning" p. 42; Koch, "Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog" p.
103.
99 Sanders, "The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning" p. 44.
100 For correspondence on the Eems see: ARA, "A-Dossiers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1871 - 1918"
archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 368, file no. A162.
101 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 1 August 1914, in SMG/DC, "Snijders, Comelis Jacobus 29.9.52"
397/S.
102 "Notulen van de Buitegewoon Ministerraad" [Notes from the extraordinary cabinet meeting] 29 July 1914, Smit
(ed.), Bescheiden betrefJellde de buitelliandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919.
Vierde Dee11914 - 1917 p. 5.