Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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over both sides of the waterway, the Eems presented a less obvious neutrality dilemma than
the Schelde. Germany even mined the entrance, and, later in the war, refused access to the
river mouth for Dutch merchant vessels. 103 That Britain did not question Dutch behaviour
regarding the Eems issue may reflect an acknowledgement that Gennany had an accepted
claim to the river. At any rate, militarily and economically the Eems was far less important
to Britain than the Schelde.
The case of the Eems and Schelde illustrate how the perceptions of the belligerents
affected Dutch neutrality. Clearly, such perception equally applied to the Netherlands' other
territorial waters. Because the country did not have a large naval capability, it had trouble
ensuring that belligerent warships did not cross into Dutch waters. 104 The navies of each of
the warring parties did so on several occasions, but the Dutch Navy was usually able to
warn contravening warships and they would tum back towards international waters.
However, there were some potentially serious transgressions. !Os For example, in
July 1917, British warships fired at Gennan merchant ships travelling through Dutch
waters. The Dutch despatched several warships to prevent further attacks and remove the
British from the scene, or (as a last resort) to fight against the offenders and thereby declare
war. Eventually, the Allied warships ceased their bombardment of the German vessels and
returned to international waters. 106 The Netherlands was able to avoid an international
incident and remained neutral. Yet theoretically, the neutrality of the Netherlands had been
breached by military means. If they had followed the Hague Conventions strictly, the Dutch
should have gone to war with Britain for undertaking military action in their waters.
Gennany could have forced the issue as they witnessed the inability of the Netherlands to
prevent the British attack. That neither Britain nor Gennany issued a declaration of war
against the Netherlands reflects their lack of desire to see the neutral become a belligerent.
103 Provincial Governor of Groningen to Minister President, 21 November 1916, in ARA, "A-Dossiers van het
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken1871 - 1918" archive no. 2.05.03, inventory no. 368; Snijders, "Nederland's
militaire positie" pp. 538 - 539.
104 Nagelhout, "De toelating en internering" p. 34.
105 Ibid.
106 This incident is described in more detail in: Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, pp. 226 - 229; Smit, Nederland
in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel. pp. 50 - 51; Gel' van del' Burg, "Enkele gebeurtenissen in de Nederlandse
territoriale wateren 1914 - 1918" in Western Front Association Nederland, Opgediept Verleden III. Lezingen Western
Front Association Nederland 1990 - 1995. [Recovered past III. Lectures of the Western Front Association of the
Netherlands 1990 - 1995] place of publication unknown: Western Front Association Nederland, 1995, pp. 27 - 37.