Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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more cautious, however, about accepting land support without first consulting with the
cabinet, since it was far more difficult to argue such aid was accidental or to justify the lack
of opposition from troops to the breach of territory. Nevertheless, he did order that ifland
support arrived from either side, the Dutch Anny should not oppose it unless they received
specific instmctions to do SO.33
Snijders trod very unsteady ground in ignoring the orders given to him by cabinet
ministers, another clear indication that he often acted according to his own criteria and
expectations. His strong belief that he was right and, as the ultimate authority in the
military, should have free rein when it carne to defence matters, caused considerable
friction with successive Ministers of War. Such difficulties came to a head in 1918, firstly
in a heated discussion with Minister B. C. de Jonge about the viability of Dutch military
defence, and finally, in November when Snijders resigned only days before the Atmistice
was signed. 34 It is indicative, however, that intense differences in opinion between the
Commander and his government had existed well before the 1918 crises.
DETERRENCE
Without well-defined operational defence strategies in place, the deterrence value
of the Dutch mobilisation diminished. Deterrence was a negative neutrality policy.35 Its
purpose was to dissuade warring states from attacking a neutral as the associated costs,
whether military, economic, or diplomatic, would be too great. It can be contrasted to more
positive neutrality strategies that emphasised the advantages of respecting neutrality, rather
than the disadvantages of rejecting neutrality. The benefit of armed deterrence was that it
could be implemented in peacetime, as an "anticipatory effect of neutrality",36 and was
based on outsiders' perceptions of a neutral's military strength. It was, therefore, vitally
important for the Netherlands to adveliise itself as a strong and prepared nation. The
impOliance of deterrence for the preservation of Dutch non-belligerency is best illustrated
33 Commander-in-Chief, "Bijzondere instructie voor den Commandant der Stelling van de Monden der Maas en der
Schelde, voor zooveel het Commando Zeeland betreft" [Extraordinary instructions for the Commander of the
Fortified Position of the Mouths of the Maas and Schelde Rivers, as far as they apply to the Command of Zeeland] 9
January 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
34 See: Chapter 12, pp. 419 - 420.
35 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States p. 63.
36 Karl Strupp, in Sigmund Widmer, "Forms of neutrality" in Joseph Kruzel, Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Between the
blocs. Problems and prospects for Europe's neutral and nonaligned states. Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 25.