Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

- 139 -
the will of the entire cabinet, he had to interpret this disagreement as an argument for the
continuance of a policy of strict neutrality.28
The government did not deviate from this position. In March 1917, Cort van der
Linden replied to one of Snijders' requests:
The position of the government remains unchanged that against every one of the
belligerents who try to breach our territory ... the full might of our armed forces
will be mobilised. A consideration of other interests apart from the interest to
immediately repel [ an attack] is not an option 29
Snijders was immensely frustrated by this stand as it left him without a clear policy to
follow and with few feasible options. 30 In the margins of one ofCort van den Linden's
letters, he wrote: "What must I do! The government now lmows that I will not fight against
both parties!" (italics added)3! A month earlier he had already warned the ministers that:
I must earnestly declare that I see this decision [to remain mobilised facing all
directions] as being so completely incompatible with the demands of a proper
strategy and besides believe it to be so completely futile for attaining a
favourable outcome, that I would not be able to accept such an instruction. 32
In the end, the Commander-in-Chief followed governmental guidelines only in
part. In instructions to his commanders in January 1918, Snijders proclaimed that if the
Netherlands was attacked by one of the major powers (namely Britain or Germany), they
should accept help from the other belligerent if it came in the fonn of artillery fire, air cover
or naval intervention. This assistance was to be accepted even if the intervention was
undeclared or came unasked. Despite the fact that such actions contravened Dutch
neutrality (and governmental directives), Snijders felt that he had to be pragmatic. He was
28 For the cabinet's stand on neutrality between October 1914 and February 1915, and especially in relation to armed
defence, see: Smit, Nederland ill de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Tweede dee!. pp. 14 - 21; Dunk, "Nederland ten tijde van
de eerste wereldoorlog" p. 43; Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" pp. 119 - 125; Koch, "Nederland en de Eerste
Wereldoorlog" p. 102.
29 "Ret standpunt del' Regeering blijft echter onveranderd dat tegenover ieder der belligerenten die ons grondgebied
zou trachten te schenden ... de volle kracht van onze weermacht moet worden aangewend. Van een overweging van
andere belangen dan het belang van onmiddellijk verzet is ... geen sprake" (Minister President to Commander-in­
Chief, 8 March 1917, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4).
30 Koch, "Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog" pp. 103 - 104.
31 "Maar wat moet ik dan doen! De Regeering weet nu, dat ik niet vecht tegen beide partijen!" (italics added) (C. J.
Snijders' handwritten marginal addition to the letter by the Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 8 March
1917, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 4).
32 "Ik moet ten ernstigste verklaren, dat ik deze opvatting als zoo volkomen in strijd beschouw met de eischen eener
juiste strategie en haar bovendien zoo beslist noodlottig acht voor eenig uitzicht op een gunstigen uitslag, dat ik eene
opdracht in dien zin niet zou kunnen aanvaarden." (Commander-in-Chiefto Minister President, 14 February 1917,
ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' ently no. 2.13.70, inventOlY no. 4).