Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

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CHApTER SIx The world’s median age is expected to increase from 29.2 years in 2010 to 37.9 in 2050, a change that will be felt most strongly in developing countries. While the proportion of people aged 60 or above rose from 8.1% in 1950 to 11% in 2010, it is expected to reach 21.8% in 2050. 82 policy changes. under a ‘high variant’ scenario, the world population would reach 10.6 billion by 2050, while the ‘low variant’ alternative projects 8.1 billion by 2050 (unDESa, 2011a). 59 the ‘constant fertility’ assumption generates huge population growth, but this is unlikely to materialise given historical trends and patterns of demographic transition. nonetheless, fairly small changes in the underlying assumptions – especially with regard to fertility rates – can generate large differences in the forecasts (see Figure 6.1). broad population trends mask regional variations (see Figure 6.2). at the regional level, SSa is expected to experience the highest nominal and relative population increases, as its population is likely to more than double by 2050 (to about 2.2 billion). asia will remain the world’s most populated region, although its share of world population will decline as SSa’s grows. the population of the remaining regions will grow only marginally, if at all. collectively, africa and asia will represent nearly 80% of the world population by 2050, while Europe will account for 8%, down from the 22% registered in 1950 (unDESa, 2011a). Despite the decline in the rate of growth, the world population will continue to grow in the medium term, mainly because of predicted growth in developing countries, which will be equivalent to the entire (mostly stagnant) population of more developed countries (about 1.2 billion people). 6.1.2 Ageing societies the broad demographic dynamics described above will also affect the age structure of the world population. For instance, while a country’s population size usually booms in the early stages of demographic transition, its growth tends to decelerate as birth rates EuropEan rEport on DEvElopmEnt 2013 and mortality rates converge. 60 barring significant migration, this usually leads to an increase in the median age of the population. population ageing is an inevitable outcome of lower fertility rates and greater life expectancy. as more countries undergo this demographic transition, the world’s median age is expected to increase from 29.2 years in 2010 to 37.9 in 2050, a change that will be felt most strongly in developing countries. In addition, while the proportion of people aged 60 or above rose from 8.1% in 1950 to 11% in 2010, it is expected to reach 21.8% in 2050. In more developed countries, the proportion of the population aged 60 years and above is projected to increase from 21.7% in 2010 to 31.9% in 2050, and of over-80s from 4.3% to 9.3% (unDESa, 2011a). these trends will mean a substantial increase in old-age dependency ratios. 61 between 1950 and 2010, the world ratio rose from 0.09 to 0.12 dependants and is projected to reach 0.26 by 2050. In other words, in 1950 there were 11 people of working age per elderly person, whereas by 2010 there were eight and the ratio is expected to drop to four by 2040. In china, for example, the old-age dependency ratio of 0.11 in 2010 is projected to increase to 0.42 by 2050, while the ratio in Europe will increase from 0.24 in 2010 to 0.47 in 2050 (unDESa, 2011a). these trends are likely to have significant impacts on the demand for health services and pensions, as well as on tax revenues, and may affect intergenerational solidarity and dynamics. International migration, especially from africa, could potentially play a role in rejuvenating ageing populations and reversing these trends. While there are concerns about population ageing, youth has also become a major issue in national and international policy agendas, notably 59 the medium variant assumes that global fertility will fall from 2.52 children per woman between 2005 and 2010 to 2.17 by 2045–2050, while the low [high] variant assumes that fertility rates are 0.5 children below [above] that of the medium variant. 60 Initially, mortality rates decline sharply due to better health (reduced child survival and increased life expectancy) while fertility rates remain comparatively high. 61 this is the ratio of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged between 15 and 64 years.
105 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 105 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Figure 6.3 Population by age group and sex (world and Africa) WORLD 1950 Male Female 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 WORLD 2050 Male Female poSt-2015: Global actIon For an IncluSIvE anD SuStaInablE FuturE 105 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 0 0 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 Source: UNDESA, 2011a 105 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 WORLD 2010 Male Female WORLD 2100 Male Female The under-25s represent 44.4% of the world population and many are likely to face problems of economic and political exclusion. 83
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EUROPEAN REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT 2013
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MOBILISING EUROPEAN RESEARCH FOR DE
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FOREWORD The development road we ha
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ACknOWlEDgEmEnT The European report
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TAblE OF COnTEnTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT V
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CHAPTER 9. PEOPLE: LABOUR MIGRATION
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Figure 5.2 Evolution of depth of po
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EITI Extractive Industries transpar
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PSG peace-building and state-buildi
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mainly countries in Europe, north a
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ExEcutivE Summary poSt-2015: Global
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ExECuTIvE SummARy poSt-2015: Global
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poSt-2015: Global actIon For an Inc
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THE DEPLOYMENT OF A BROAD RANGE OF
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introduction poSt-2015: Global actI
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2. The case for global collective a
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upon in order to promote a developm
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to achieve inclusive and sustainabl
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contribute to a global framework fo
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Part i. KEEPing thE PromiSE of thE
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mortality, and clean water and sani
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Table 1.2 Non-income MDGs, 1990-201
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Several regions significantly reduc
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Figure 1.1 Sectoral allocation of b
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of tailored objectives that are ins
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policy discourse. In particular, th
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processes and implementation arrang
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NEPAL RWANDA COTE D’IVOIRE PERU E
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• Nepal after over 200 years as a
Page 69 and 70: Box 2.3 Côte d’Ivoire’s MDG ac
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Page 73 and 74: drive or obstruct poverty-reduction
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Page 79 and 80: incentive structures within which e
Page 81 and 82: partners: their capacities as donor
Page 83 and 84: Box 2.9 Fragility - Country case ex
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Page 87 and 88: 3.2 The EU’s role in advancing th
Page 89 and 90: at the 2010 mDG Summit, un member s
Page 91 and 92: adopted by individual governments,
Page 93 and 94: discussions on pcD are not based on
Page 95 and 96: Part ii. thE changing contExt for a
Page 97 and 98: Figure 4.1 Changing global power 20
Page 99 and 100: crops (ErD, 2012). at the same time
Page 101 and 102: egimes, and donor-driven aid condit
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Page 105 and 106: of people living in extreme income
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Page 109 and 110: deprivation, whether directly or th
Page 111 and 112: has been declining since the early
Page 113 and 114: vulnerability (ErD 2012). this repo
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Page 117 and 118: need to focus on eradicating existi
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Page 123 and 124: due to the so-called arab Spring in
Page 125 and 126: moreover, migration policy can shap
Page 127 and 128: the Eu and 9% for the uSa. these sh
Page 129 and 130: accumulation patterns (from 35% of
Page 131 and 132: Table 6.1 Poverty projections expec
Page 133 and 134: 6.3.1 Atmosphere and global warming
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Page 141 and 142: ECONOMY DEMOGRAPHY ENVIRONMENT NEUT
Page 143 and 144: Part iii. drivErS of thE global Par
Page 145 and 146: Current USD Billions Current USD Bi
Page 147 and 148: global financial crisis has reduced
Page 149 and 150: lmIcs and lIcs (oEcD, 2011b). Figur
Page 151 and 152: Box 7.1 Efforts to increase tax rev
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Page 155 and 156: India (de Jesus, 2012). there has b
Page 157 and 158: levels of formal education. third,
Page 159 and 160: While the mobilisation of funds fro
Page 161 and 162: Box 7.4 EU blending facilities Sinc
Page 163 and 164: Box 7.5 The toolbox of innovative f
Page 165 and 166: Figure 7.8 Net capital flows to dev
Page 167 and 168: which are many in developed countri
Page 169 and 170: and financial inclusion (Deuchert a
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Box 7.8 Implications for post-2015
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a means to reach development goals
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PREDICTABILITY ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENC
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this chapter first looks at some of
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social development, largely fuelled
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Box 8.1 Joining the flying geese Ka
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these structural shifts in the driv
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traditional donors and investors, c
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1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 Sou
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Figure 8.2 Share of primary commodi
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Box 8.2 Political economy of commod
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achieve results. With regard to tra
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in turn is highly dependent on Eu p
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productive capacity through value-a
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economies are structurally marginal
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impede exports to Eu, which are inc
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fair access to and equitable distri
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lDcs to foster trade growth and ach
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the role for trade and investment p
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labour migration produces remittanc
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the 2008 global financial crisis le
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Macro-economic impact International
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Social impact and psychological wel
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labour during that period. this pro
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Millions 10.4 4 N 3 2 1 0 Mexico-US
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migration programmes (tmps) are usu
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date, four mobility partnerships ha
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labour organization (Ilo) refers to
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workers, point to areas of concern
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9.5.2 Mode IV in the WTO the Wto’
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9.6.2 What a post-2015 framework sh
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concluSionS and rEcommEndationS Thi
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‘how’). this chapter also consi
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and so do not figure much in the go
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tackling global challenges. While s
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10.3.1 Poverty eradication as part
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Box 10.1 Economic and social inclus
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Box 10.2 Youth Employment About 85%
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International development partners
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at the multilateral level, the link
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• South-South Cooperation resourc
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information and evaluation initiati
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for consultative processes to take
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e added later. Equally it would be
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- such as their size and geographic
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(com, 2011). the aid-effectiveness
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Box 10.5 Areas for EU support: Reco
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there will need to be a continuing
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unrISD (2010) Combating Poverty and
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moore, m. (2011) ‘The Governance
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Chapter 4 birdsall, n. (2012) ‘Th
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Kharas, H. and rogerson, a. (2012)
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Kharas, H. and rogerson, a. (2012)
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cobham, a. (2012) ‘tax Havens and
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lall, r. (2011) ‘reforming Global
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unDp (2012) ‘What Is South-South
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Fine, b. (2009) ‘neoliberalism in
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Sindzingre, a. (2009) ‘The impact
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chanda, r. (2004) Movement and Pres
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Kouadio, E.K., ouattara, Y. and Sou
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un-InStraW and SaIIa (2007) Gender,
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Winters, a. and martins, p. (2004)
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Goals and Targets (from the Millenn
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Goals and Targets (from the Millenn
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conflict assessment, which also del
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the case study report suggests that
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in rwanda compared to an average of
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large educated class. Immigration w
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administration, with greater autono
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example, in low increases in tax ef
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AnnEx 3 - CORE pRInCIplES FOR InvES
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MOBILISING EUROPEAN RESEARCH FOR DE
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Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

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