Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

crops (ErD, 2012). at the same time, there is much
potential for channelling common interests and
seizing opportunities to work on specific global
public goods issues such as disease eradication,
renewable energy, food security or maritime
governance, where both international cooperation
and finance are needed. the experience and
trust built up by working together in areas where
cooperation is easier might help in resolving more
difficult conflicts in other areas.
there is a long-standing and important dilemma
in the political economy of development cooperation
regarding donor preferences. How can trade-offs
between different legitimate but contradictory
interests be reconciled, such as that between aid
effectiveness and tied aid? How can economic and
development interests be channelled through policy
in order to achieve mutual benefits? this question
is particularly pertinent to the private sector: as
developing countries and regions have become
wealthier and more integrated into the global
economy, they have increasingly been seen as lands
of economic opportunity. this is manifest in the
growing interest of Western companies in engaging
with developing countries, particularly in africa,
beyond their traditional interest in natural resources
(Wonacott, 2011). the uSa retailer Walmart, for
example, has established a presence in South africa
and is looking to consolidate its long-term grocery
business in several other african countries (reuters,
2012). German infrastructure and technology giant
Siemens has increased its presence in africa in
the last decade, focusing on urban infrastructure,
green energy and healthcare. It is to be expected
that business interests influence government policy.
In July 2011 the former uK Secretary of State
for Development, andrew mitchell, announced
that ‘africa is open for business’ (mitchell, 2011).
Germany’s mid-2011 afrika Konzept stated that
economic cooperation would be a top priority in the
future relationship, and envisaged increased trade
ties with africa and new markets for German exports
(bundesregierung, 2011). However, as discussed in
chapter 8, the interests of foreign investors need
to be carefully balanced with those of developing
countries and their development priorities.
among developing countries, there are major
questions regarding what kind of policy reforms
they wish to implement. as discussed in chapter
2 the policies governments pursue are the product
of a complex interaction between structures,
institutions and actors. the preferences of organised
social groups range across a wide spectrum
from building more transparent, accountable
systems capable of delivering public goods and
reducing socioeconomic inequality to interests in
maintaining elite-dominated political processes
where the privileged few seek an even bigger slice
of the pie. Questions of who gets what and how
this is organised are particularly salient in conflictaffected
and fragile countries. In most developing (as
in most industrialised) countries, domestic politics
is about reconciling these preferences. International
cooperation also involves domestic trade-offs, such
as between meeting the costs of providing public
goods with diffuse benefits and compensating the
clientelist interests of specific social groups.
4.3 What institutional outcomes
are likely?
the international system is characterised by
sometimes fractious relations between interestdriven
and competitive politics, on the one hand,
and interdependence and the need for cooperation
on global issues and public policies on the other.
as ‘new’ actors gain the power to pursue their
preferences in global bargaining processes, the
task of designing institutions capable of balancing
these heterogeneous goals becomes more uncertain,
difficult and complex (page, 2008).
changes in actors’ ability to pursue their
preferences are starting to result in changes in the
institutional settings through which they cooperate.
poSt-2015: Global actIon For an IncluSIvE anD SuStaInablE FuturE
There is a longstanding
and
important
dilemma in the
political economy
of development
cooperation
regarding donor
preferences. How
can trade-offs
between different
legitimate but
contradictory
interests be
reconciled?
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