Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future
Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future
Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future
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drive or obstruct poverty-reduction or development<br />
policy choices <strong>an</strong>d implementation measures.<br />
political economy refers to a broad set of intellectual<br />
traditions. typically, there are three tiers of <strong>an</strong>alytical<br />
tools developed <strong>for</strong> country <strong>an</strong>d sector levels:<br />
• Structures: the first level deals with structural,<br />
‘hard to ch<strong>an</strong>ge’ or intr<strong>an</strong>sigent features such<br />
as natural resource endowments, the broad<br />
structure of the economy, regional relations,<br />
the main sources of (potential) government<br />
revenues, etc. the structure of the economy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the resource endowment, <strong>for</strong> example, may<br />
influence the nature of government revenues.<br />
Such revenues may be earned (through taxation)<br />
or unearned (such as derived from mineral rents,<br />
oDa, etc.). the nature of these revenues often<br />
shapes the political incentives facing particular<br />
groups – most often ruling elites 16 (see also box<br />
2.6). other import<strong>an</strong>t features may include<br />
the history of state <strong>for</strong>mation, the exclusion<br />
of regions <strong>an</strong>d population groups, which may<br />
cause social, ethnic <strong>an</strong>d economic cleavages,<br />
threats to state legitimacy, internal conflict <strong>an</strong>d<br />
fragility. Such features were clearly at the heart<br />
of the deep-rooted conflicts in all four casestudy<br />
countries.<br />
• Institutions: at a second level, political economy<br />
<strong>an</strong>alysis is interested in how institutions function<br />
<strong>an</strong>d shape the behaviour of political <strong>an</strong>d economic<br />
actors. In all countries, <strong>for</strong>mal institutions<br />
(<strong>an</strong>chored in the constitution, codified in laws,<br />
etc.) interact with in<strong>for</strong>mal rules of the game<br />
(based on social, cultural, ethnic, religious<br />
norms <strong>an</strong>d beliefs) <strong>an</strong>d these interactions shape<br />
the distribution of power, the nature of political<br />
competition, the functioning of markets, etc. It<br />
is often difficult <strong>for</strong> outsiders, such as donors, to<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d or even ‘see’ in<strong>for</strong>mal institutions,<br />
because the conceptual toolkit has been largely<br />
designed to focus on the tip of the iceberg, i.e.<br />
<strong>for</strong>mal institutions. the consequence is that<br />
external development agents undermine ‘their<br />
ability to identify ch<strong>an</strong>ge opportunities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
constraints <strong>an</strong>d explains why re<strong>for</strong>ms face<br />
recurring limits’ (<strong>an</strong>drews, 2013: 42).<br />
• Actors: the structural <strong>an</strong>d institutional levels<br />
shape political processes <strong>an</strong>d influence the<br />
behaviour <strong>an</strong>d choices of key actors. In a stylised<br />
way, one c<strong>an</strong> distinguish three groups of actors<br />
(see Figure 2.1): the ruling political elite, state<br />
bureaucrats <strong>an</strong>d sector actors (civil society, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
firms, farms <strong>an</strong>d households). In <strong>an</strong> ideal state<br />
of affairs, these groups would effectively work<br />
together in mutual, cooperative <strong>an</strong>d synergistic<br />
ways <strong>an</strong>d generate positive development<br />
outcomes (a Joint Statement, 2012). this is not<br />
what tends to happen in developing countries.<br />
the pattern of relations is often one in which<br />
ruling elites or governments do not make credible<br />
commitments to sector actors relating to the<br />
safety of <strong>an</strong>d the gains from their investments.<br />
usually, such ruling elites do not prioritise the<br />
provision of public or collective goods that may<br />
stimulate private investment, or they do not give<br />
priority to constructive engagement between the<br />
state bureaucracy <strong>an</strong>d sector actors.<br />
one might ask why donors <strong>an</strong>d recipient countries<br />
have m<strong>an</strong>aged to engage in the logic of development<br />
narratives <strong>for</strong> so long, with so little evidence that aid<br />
does much to contribute to the latters’ administrative<br />
capability. one <strong>an</strong>swer is the so-called ‘isomorphic<br />
mimicry’, whereby bureaucrats <strong>an</strong>d elites in aidrecipient<br />
countries adopt the appropriate institutional<br />
appear<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d structures (or <strong>for</strong>ms) in order to hide<br />
or camouflage the fact that they have not adopted the<br />
institutional functions. this results in empty policy<br />
gestures <strong>an</strong>d (often costly <strong>an</strong>d time-consuming)<br />
re<strong>for</strong>ms that are never implemented. re<strong>for</strong>ms are<br />
adopted as mere ‘signals’. by overlooking import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
features of the context, external backers risk betting<br />
16 the term ‘elite’ in this report refers to individuals who comm<strong>an</strong>d high levels of political, military, fin<strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d/or economic power.<br />
poSt-<strong>2015</strong>: <strong>Global</strong> actIon For <strong>an</strong> IncluSIvE <strong>an</strong>D SuStaInablE FuturE<br />
There has been<br />
a considerable<br />
ef<strong>for</strong>t to better<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d<br />
what drives<br />
the differences<br />
in development<br />
policy choices<br />
<strong>an</strong>d trajectories<br />
in developing<br />
countries.<br />
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