Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

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CHApTER SEvEn The SWAps involve donors deciding to support a sector and providing ODA to help the recipient government to meet its own goals. In budget support, donors channel funds directly to national budgets, leaving it to the government to set priorities and allocate resources. 118 micro level, have helped to improve aid effectiveness. two approaches in particular, programme-based approaches (pbas) and results-based approaches (rbas), illustrate ways to improve the contribution of oDa to development. pbas are currently the main approach to applying the principles of aid effectiveness, while rbas demonstrate efforts to document what oDa achieves in order to justify its continuation. Programme-based Approaches pbas are seen as a way to apply aid-effectiveness principles to improve the contribution of oDa to development, not least in terms of enhancing policy space for aid-recipient governments. over the last decade, donors have shifted their focus from projects to pbas, which are defined as way of ‘engaging in development cooperation based on the principles of coordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation’ (oEcD/Dac, 2008: 148). the 2005 paris Declaration committed donors to providing 66% of oDa via pbas, but so far not one of the 78 countries that participated in the evaluation of progress has met this target and only 45% of all oDa was provided via pba (oEcD, 2012a). meeting or even approaching the pba target might significantly improve the contribution of oDa to development. there are various ways to pursue pbas, including pooled (or basket) funding for specific activities, joint support for sector-wide approaches (SWaps) and sector or general budget support (leiderer, 2012; Handley, 2009; Koeberle et al., 2006). the latter two are particularly prominent. the SWaps involve donors – often working as a group – deciding to support a sector and providing oDa to help the recipient government to meet its own goals. In budget support, donors channel funds directly to national budgets, leaving it to the government to 77 the European commission usually refers to SWaps as Sector policy Support programmes. EuropEan rEport on DEvElopmEnt 2013 set priorities and allocate resources, usually on the basis of prior discussion. these two mechanisms give the recipient governments more ownership and policy space in how they spend oDa, and evaluations of budget support have indicated that it helps to improve aid effectiveness (caputo et al., 2011; De Kemp et al., 2011). aid-recipient governments benefit from the greater predictability of oDa for multi-year programmes. the European commission has been one of the key promoters of budget support and SWaps 77 (Faust et al., 2012a). In nepal, the share of SWaps as a proportion of total foreign aid increased from 12.9% in 2004 to 21.1% in 2012 (nepal case study – pandey et al., 2012). the SWaps were focused on health, education, local development, peace and reconstruction as well as renewable energy. In rwanda, the government has signed seven SWap agreements in agriculture, education, energy, environment and natural resources, health, justice and transport. the government plans to adopt a strategy and spending programme for each sector. the governments of côte d’Ivoire, nepal and rwanda have also expressed their strong preference for budget support, delivered either as general budget support or focused on specific sectors (country case studies). there are several ways in which to improve SWaps and budget support in order to make a more effective contribution to development. In nepal, for instance, despite the SWaps, in 2011 there were 37 projects under the ministry of Education and 81 under the ministry of Health and population. Second, SWaps often apply to the area of responsibility of a single ministry rather than the whole sector. For example, primary education may be covered by a SWap, but not secondary or tertiary education, which come under the purview of a different ministry, despite the crucial need to ensure coordination across all
levels of formal education. third, it has sometimes been perceived that the donors become more operationally involved under SWaps (nepal case study – pandey et al., 2012). For budget support, a major challenge is that donors often have competing objectives and fail to coordinate and establish common priorities. their objectives in providing budget support range from poverty reduction to promoting sectoral and governance reforms. although evaluations of budget support demonstrate its effectiveness, there is a danger of ‘overloading’ it with competing objectives (Faust et al., 2012b). this makes it hard for governments to focus on any of the objectives, which means that budget support falls short of its potential. In such cases, the lack of coherence among donors prevents recipient governments from being able to plan and budget. Results-based approaches results-based approaches can be divided into resultsbased aid and results-based financing. the former involves government-to-government aid and the latter contracts to service providers (pearson, 2011). results-based aid usually includes negotiations on several key steps (Klingebiel, 2012). First, the intended result must be agreed since the provision of oDa is conditional upon its achievement. Second, an independent third party must be identified to evaluate the results. It is difficult to assess the level of rba to date because most projects are still at the pilot stage, and it therefore represents only a minor share of overall oDa. In principle, linking aid more closely to performance can be attractive both for donors and for aid-recipient governments. It allows the latter to allocate aid more efficiently, expanding successful programmes and cutting back on weaker ones (morris and pryke, 2011). It also enables donors to produce evidence of the impact of oDa because rbas verify that the intended outcomes have been achieved. rbas are also an opportunity for governments to obtain funding without donors interfering in their domestic affairs because the negotiations are about results and not approaches. rba is thus likely to provide incentives for governments to achieve results in their own ways and resolve their own policy or bureaucratic constraints. Governments may also become more accountable to their domestic constituency because rba may encourage them to improve the quality of service provision (Klingebiel, 2012), which might in turn increase ownership of their political and administrative systems. rbas could potentially contribute more to development if certain issues were addressed. First, the concept definition varies and the terminology remains unclear. the European commission, governments, bilateral aid agencies and others use terms such as results-based aid, cash-on-delivery, pay-for-performance and results-based financing, sometimes to mean different things. In addition, there is still a lack of empirical evidence since various forms of ‘managing for results’ projects, as set out in the paris Declaration, are still being piloted or are in their infancy. For example, nepal has embarked on a bridge-improved project with the support of the World bank under program-forresults (p4r) lending that started only in July 2012. the success of rbas also depends on requirements that can be difficult to fulfil. First, producing a comprehensive and exact assessment of the existing situation relies on having reliable baseline data. Second, the contracting partners have to agree on a precise formulation of expected results, and on measurement and monitoring methods. third, the assessment of results again requires reliable information and data. Each of these may result in costs. there is also the risk that rbas could encourage donors to favour short-term programmes with outcomes that can be directly attributed to their support. this would undermine donor coordination poSt-2015: Global actIon For an IncluSIvE anD SuStaInablE FuturE In principle, linking aid more closely to performance can be attractive both for donors and for aid-recipient governments. 119
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EUROPEAN REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT 2013
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MOBILISING EUROPEAN RESEARCH FOR DE
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FOREWORD The development road we ha
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ACknOWlEDgEmEnT The European report
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TAblE OF COnTEnTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT V
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CHAPTER 9. PEOPLE: LABOUR MIGRATION
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Figure 5.2 Evolution of depth of po
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EITI Extractive Industries transpar
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PSG peace-building and state-buildi
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mainly countries in Europe, north a
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ExEcutivE Summary poSt-2015: Global
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ExECuTIvE SummARy poSt-2015: Global
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poSt-2015: Global actIon For an Inc
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THE DEPLOYMENT OF A BROAD RANGE OF
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introduction poSt-2015: Global actI
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2. The case for global collective a
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upon in order to promote a developm
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to achieve inclusive and sustainabl
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contribute to a global framework fo
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Part i. KEEPing thE PromiSE of thE
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mortality, and clean water and sani
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Table 1.2 Non-income MDGs, 1990-201
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Several regions significantly reduc
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Figure 1.1 Sectoral allocation of b
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of tailored objectives that are ins
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policy discourse. In particular, th
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processes and implementation arrang
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NEPAL RWANDA COTE D’IVOIRE PERU E
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• Nepal after over 200 years as a
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Box 2.3 Côte d’Ivoire’s MDG ac
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Declaration and the mDGs, and were
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drive or obstruct poverty-reduction
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Driven by political survival and co
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oader political processes in which
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incentive structures within which e
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partners: their capacities as donor
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Box 2.9 Fragility - Country case ex
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towards the achievement of the mDGs
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3.2 The EU’s role in advancing th
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at the 2010 mDG Summit, un member s
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adopted by individual governments,
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discussions on pcD are not based on
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Part ii. thE changing contExt for a
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Figure 4.1 Changing global power 20
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crops (ErD, 2012). at the same time
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egimes, and donor-driven aid condit
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for an Eu position to be agreed ahe
Page 105 and 106: of people living in extreme income
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Page 109 and 110: deprivation, whether directly or th
Page 111 and 112: has been declining since the early
Page 113 and 114: vulnerability (ErD 2012). this repo
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Page 117 and 118: need to focus on eradicating existi
Page 119 and 120: 27.5 25 22.5 20 17.5 15 12.5 10 7.5
Page 121 and 122: 105 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Page 123 and 124: due to the so-called arab Spring in
Page 125 and 126: moreover, migration policy can shap
Page 127 and 128: the Eu and 9% for the uSa. these sh
Page 129 and 130: accumulation patterns (from 35% of
Page 131 and 132: Table 6.1 Poverty projections expec
Page 133 and 134: 6.3.1 Atmosphere and global warming
Page 135 and 136: supports ecosystem services that pr
Page 137 and 138: about 70% (mainly led by china, Ind
Page 139 and 140: scarcity leads to high and volatile
Page 141 and 142: ECONOMY DEMOGRAPHY ENVIRONMENT NEUT
Page 143 and 144: Part iii. drivErS of thE global Par
Page 145 and 146: Current USD Billions Current USD Bi
Page 147 and 148: global financial crisis has reduced
Page 149 and 150: lmIcs and lIcs (oEcD, 2011b). Figur
Page 151 and 152: Box 7.1 Efforts to increase tax rev
Page 153 and 154: While SSc is not new, it has receiv
Page 155: India (de Jesus, 2012). there has b
Page 159 and 160: While the mobilisation of funds fro
Page 161 and 162: Box 7.4 EU blending facilities Sinc
Page 163 and 164: Box 7.5 The toolbox of innovative f
Page 165 and 166: Figure 7.8 Net capital flows to dev
Page 167 and 168: which are many in developed countri
Page 169 and 170: and financial inclusion (Deuchert a
Page 171 and 172: Box 7.8 Implications for post-2015
Page 173 and 174: a means to reach development goals
Page 175 and 176: PREDICTABILITY ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENC
Page 177 and 178: this chapter first looks at some of
Page 179 and 180: social development, largely fuelled
Page 181 and 182: Box 8.1 Joining the flying geese Ka
Page 183 and 184: these structural shifts in the driv
Page 185 and 186: traditional donors and investors, c
Page 187 and 188: 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 Sou
Page 189 and 190: Figure 8.2 Share of primary commodi
Page 191 and 192: Box 8.2 Political economy of commod
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Page 195 and 196: in turn is highly dependent on Eu p
Page 197 and 198: productive capacity through value-a
Page 199 and 200: economies are structurally marginal
Page 201 and 202: impede exports to Eu, which are inc
Page 203 and 204: fair access to and equitable distri
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the role for trade and investment p
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labour migration produces remittanc
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the 2008 global financial crisis le
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Macro-economic impact International
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Social impact and psychological wel
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labour during that period. this pro
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Millions 10.4 4 N 3 2 1 0 Mexico-US
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migration programmes (tmps) are usu
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date, four mobility partnerships ha
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labour organization (Ilo) refers to
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workers, point to areas of concern
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9.5.2 Mode IV in the WTO the Wto’
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9.6.2 What a post-2015 framework sh
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concluSionS and rEcommEndationS Thi
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‘how’). this chapter also consi
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and so do not figure much in the go
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tackling global challenges. While s
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10.3.1 Poverty eradication as part
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Box 10.1 Economic and social inclus
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Box 10.2 Youth Employment About 85%
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International development partners
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at the multilateral level, the link
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• South-South Cooperation resourc
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information and evaluation initiati
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for consultative processes to take
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e added later. Equally it would be
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- such as their size and geographic
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(com, 2011). the aid-effectiveness
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Box 10.5 Areas for EU support: Reco
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there will need to be a continuing
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unrISD (2010) Combating Poverty and
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moore, m. (2011) ‘The Governance
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Chapter 4 birdsall, n. (2012) ‘Th
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Kharas, H. and rogerson, a. (2012)
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Kharas, H. and rogerson, a. (2012)
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cobham, a. (2012) ‘tax Havens and
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lall, r. (2011) ‘reforming Global
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unDp (2012) ‘What Is South-South
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Fine, b. (2009) ‘neoliberalism in
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Sindzingre, a. (2009) ‘The impact
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chanda, r. (2004) Movement and Pres
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Kouadio, E.K., ouattara, Y. and Sou
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un-InStraW and SaIIa (2007) Gender,
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Winters, a. and martins, p. (2004)
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Goals and Targets (from the Millenn
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Goals and Targets (from the Millenn
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conflict assessment, which also del
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the case study report suggests that
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in rwanda compared to an average of
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large educated class. Immigration w
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administration, with greater autono
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example, in low increases in tax ef
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AnnEx 3 - CORE pRInCIplES FOR InvES
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MOBILISING EUROPEAN RESEARCH FOR DE
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Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

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