Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

CHApTER TWO
One helpful
model for
understanding
divergences of
policy choices is
focused on why
and when political
elites support the
productive sector.
The answers
help explain
divergences in
development
trajectories
between
developing
countries and
differences in
commitment to
MDGs in the
four case-study
countries.
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Source: A Joint Statement, 2012
on an inexistent horse (andrews et al., 2012). there
are many examples of governments committing to
the mDGs without taking the measures or making
the necessary institutional arrangements to meet
their stated commitments. rwanda differs from
this pattern in that the government is acting on
its poverty-reduction commitments. rwanda also
illustrates a government that can effectively combine
formal policy measures with informal institutions
of the imihigo (a performance contract with strong
traditional underpinnings) to create incentives for
state actors to attain poverty-related service-delivery
targets (booth and Golooba-mutebi, 2012).
Ruling elites and clientelism
While there is still a lively debate about how
development happens, there are a few clues to help
unravel the decision-making logics and variables
that are at work in development processes. there
has been comparative and other research on the
relations between political elites, state bureaucrats,
and private and civil-society actors. one helpful
model for understanding divergences of policy
choices that affect poverty, growth, transformation
or development processes is more broadly focused on
why and when political elites support the productive
sector. the answers to such questions also help to
Figure 2.1 Key actors in political processes
State
bureaucrats
Ruling political
elites
EuropEan rEport on DEvElopmEnt 2013
Sector actors
(firms, farms &
households)
explain the divergences in development trajectories
between developing countries, and proved to be
relevant for explaining differences in commitment
to mDGs in the four case-study countries (‘Elites,
production and poverty programme’, DISS, 2012).
rather than talk about government, this
framework invites users to target and specify the
roles and behaviour of the ruling elites and ruling
coalitions (groups and individuals that help ruling
elites obtain or retain power). the model proposes
that in both authoritarian and democratic countries,
political survival is the principal motivation for
ruling elites. In order to survive, ruling elites are
likely to face two types of pressure – competition
or opposition. the first is that the ruling elite
may be vulnerable and exposed to pressure from
excluded groups. the greater their vulnerability
the more ruling elites are likely to concentrate
on quick results or on immediate rewards to win
over constituencies or voters (in a democracy).
this leads to short-termism. the second is that
ruling coalitions can be fragmented due to internal
competition. usually this involves a combination
of horizontal power games among the higher-level
elite factions and vertical power struggles between
higher-level and lower-level factions or supporters.