Post 2015: Global Action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future

CHApTER TWO
A re-examination
of seven African
countries pointed
to some striking
features of strongly
performing
regimes. Such
features included
strong
(personalised)
leadership,
centralised
rent processes,
and long-term
horizons within
which policies
could be conceived,
tested and
altered.
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Box 2.6 Rents and development in Côte d’Ivoire and Rwanda
In Côte d’Ivoire, over the period 1960–1978, the
economy grew at an average of 7% a year, stimulating
migration towards the capital Abidjan. A
strong presidential system within a one-party
state redistributed rents based on the plantation
economy of mainly cocoa and some coffee. It
organised a skilful system of quotas to balance the
interests of various ethnic groups and to distribute
public investment in underserviced regions.
Political patronage within a context of high commodity
prices resulted in economic growth and
stability. Migration policy was an integral part of
this political economy. Moreover, the Houphouët-
Boigny government was able to extract cocoa
rents through the marketing system. It used these
resources, along with external borrowing, for productive
investments but also for redistribution
around the country to pay for the military and
garner political support, thus providing a degree
of social stability. The first 15 years of independence
are associated with what has been called
‘developmental patrimonialism’. Due to external
shocks (oil crisis, debt crisis and declining terms
of trade in the 1980s), lack of innovation (with
exhaustion of virgin land for production and
reduced productivity of cocoa trees at the end of
a 30-year planting cycle), and outside pressure for
multi-party elections, Houphouët-Boigny’s ‘grand
coalition’ broke down just prior to his death in
1993, and ultimately set the scene for the divisive
ethnic politics of later years. Centralised distribution
of cocoa rent had enabled political stability
while commodity prices were high. But market
decline undermined both the economy and the
political stability. Liberalisation policies applied
from the mid-1980s further decentralised rents
(McGovern, 2011).
The importance of this rent system for the political
survival of the ruling elite was dramatically
illustrated by the post-electoral crisis in 2010. At
the height of this crisis, regional bodies such as the
Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS)
and the EU imposed restrictive measures on Presi-
EuropEan rEport on DEvElopmEnt 2013
dent Gbagbo because of his refusal to respect the
election results. These measures aimed to cut
off the incumbent’s access to rents from cocoa
exports and the financing of the army under
Gbagbo’s command.
The post-genocide political settlement was
marked by an initial military victory of the Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF), and characterised by a centralised
control of the economic rents, a political
system with clear limits to competitive politics and
a prioritisation of public goods provision (including
in-country security), arrangements to reduce
poverty, and a commitment to economic transformation.
The control of sources of economic rents
seems to be effectively centralised and deployed
in ways that correspond to a long-term development
vision that prioritises the provision of public
goods and services. Over the last decade, the ruling
political elite has sought to broaden its support
base by demonstrating an ability to reduce
poverty and by engaging in economic transformation.
It has increased domestic revenues, fought
corruption, improved aid coordination, engaged
with a widening group of Southern partners and
actively pursued regional economic integration in
the East African Community (EAC). Similar to
some East and South-East Asian developmental
governments (see Box 2.7), Rwandan policy has
been driven by the view that social and economic
development and transformation are essential
to avoid ‘recently remembered national disaster’
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011; 2012). The
genocide and its immediate aftermath also help to
explain the unique political economy of making
and implementing policy in Rwanda. The highly
restricted nature of political competition (fear of
renewed politicisation of ethnicity) and the tight
control over the military and security apparatus
(as guarantors of power) have to be understood in
conjunction with political arrangements that aim
to share power with non-majority party (RPF)
groups, as well as implementation incentives for
social and economic policies.