I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

132
in the decision-making process. Probability estimates of risks should be taken into consideration when appropriate,
but even when this is possible it does not automatically mean that the specific weighing together of consequence and
likelihood of PRA should be applied.
The balanced precautionary principle requires an analytic paradigm that fuses the broad scanning and participatory
aspects of foresight with the analytic versatility of PRA. We will develop that line of thinking under the heading of Strategic
foresight and risk analysis. Strategic here refers to ‘investment’ decisions as defi ned above 13 . This is very much in line
with the foresight tradition and with how WG5 has understood its remit. This does not exclude, however, that similar
approaches fusing consequence- and risk-oriented views may be applicable also to the tactical role of risk assessment in
intelligence-led operations.
Identifying knowledge and competence gaps in strategic foresight and risk analysis
Foresight, understood along the lines of the definition in Section 5.2, has not yet been widely used in the context
of security. However, scenario thinking is not uncommon in this context, and it actually has one of its roots in
defence research and analysis. In the ‘balanced precautionary principle’ developed above scenarios is a necessary
component.
But whereas ’situational scenarios’ as extrapolations of current threats are quite common, the use of ’context scenarios’, i.e. of
scenarios exploring diff erent future contexts within which new and qualitatively diff erent security threats could emerge, is a
more novel development.
The foresight tradition that builds on the so-called fi ve ’C’s’: Communication between diff erent actor and stakeholder groups,
Concentration on the (mid- to long-term) future, Consensus-orientation, Coordination of the behaviour of diff erent actors, and
Commitment of participants to implement the insights gained in the process, promises to be very relevant to current debates
on the future of security and security research in Europe for a number of reasons:
The growing recognition that security needs to be understood in a much broader sense than in the past (e.g. in terms of
societal or comprehensive security) equally broadens the range of stakeholders likely to be aff ected by any action taken
in this regard.
As a consequence, there is little consensus on what (European) security is and what it should be, what its dimensions and
priorities are. It is a contentious concept driven by both technological and societal developments, and closely related to
important economic interests.
Looking at security from a European perspective requires taking into account the matters of diversity as well as the principle
of subsidiarity in order to achieve a productive division of labour with Member States, regional and local competencies. It
thus opens up additional arenas for debating and shaping the future.
And fi nally, with the prominence acquired by rather unexpected threats to security (terrorism, critical infrastructures, crises,
etc.) the necessity to provide a frame for thinking the unthinkable has been accentuated. It requires moving well beyond
the extrapolation of current trends and exploiting unknown territory.
The current capabilities and methods in foresight are quite powerful, but have been developed in a diff erent context
than security. The well-established analytical paradigm in security is, as discussed above, probabilistic risk assessment. As
indicated by the ‘balanced precautionary principle’ there is great scope for a fusion of foresight and strategic risk analysis,
i.e. risk analysis as applied to strategic problems like investment decisions. Here the more embryonic discipline of security
economics is also a player.
13 See footnote 10.
ESRIF FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Foresight and Scenarios