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I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

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146<br />

Since it is quite evident that there is no single detection technology for all threats, integration and networking of sensors<br />

will play an important role in all scanning equipment deployed at borders or other transit points. Furthermore, inspection<br />

equipment will have to integrate all sensors both from the hardware side and from the point of view of signal analysis (data<br />

correlation, data fusion algorithms, imaging and 3-D reconstruction techniques, artifi cial intelligence). Another important<br />

avenue of improvement could come from the development of specifi c detection architectures (for airports, seaports, border<br />

checkpoints). For the use of fi rst responders, the development of multipurpose detectors is highly important, as well as<br />

detectors that are embedded in daily-use equipment.<br />

Development of new instrumentation will require the parallel development of international standardization and, by<br />

consequence, testing and validation procedures.<br />

Since preparedness is an issue with a strong technical component, a key element will be training, including practical emergency<br />

exercises. Most of the people involved in security controls at crucial points (borders, main transport nodal points, buildings of high<br />

institutional/religious/cultural importance, places hosting major public events, etc.) do not have a special education in the fi eld of<br />

CBRN hazards. Nor do most people involved in reaction activities in response to a terrorist attack (fi re brigades, rescue teams, police,<br />

medical staff , crisis management teams, etc.). Dedicated training for all these categories of people should be prepared and carried<br />

out in the fi elds of awareness, detection, protection, response, and mitigation/remediation. Establishing specialized dedicated<br />

training centres at the <strong>European</strong> international level will be extremely benefi cial. Moreover, politicians and public administration<br />

managers should be made aware of the need to set up proper security measures and available means and techniques. <strong>Final</strong>ly, the<br />

public should be adequately informed to complete the goal of building a comprehensive “security culture.”<br />

6.3.4 Response<br />

CBRN incident management is diffi cult due to many adverse factors. First responders have at best a theoretical experience with<br />

handling such events, as they fortunately do not happen on a regular basis. This makes it necessary to train fi rst responders,<br />

but also all other involved authorities, adequately to these relatively rare incidents. Besides their direct impact on the physical<br />

health of aff ected persons, CBRN agents pose a special challenge to manage their psychological eff ects on the population. The<br />

terror caused by the application of CBRN agents may outweigh the physical damage by far. A timely, competent, and reliable<br />

communication by fi rst responders and authorities is crucial in the management of a CBRN crisis.<br />

In addition, the technical means of the fi rst responders to handle an incident are currently far from ideal. Personal Protective<br />

Equipment (PPE) is heavy and bulky and is a physiological burden that interferes with the operational duties of fi rst responders.<br />

In addition, PPE is not standardized or universal.<br />

Not having the capability to detect and identify CBRN agents without the aid of analytical devices causes further impediment.<br />

An ideal instrument would identify all relevant agents instantaneously at the site of the incident, have a high sensitivity,<br />

produce no false positive results, and be easy to operate. Currently available detection and identifi cation systems are mostly<br />

characterized by a narrow spectrum of detectable agents and an insuffi cient sensitivity to measure toxic / contagious amounts<br />

of agent. Moreover, they do produce false positive results. To compensate these lacks, the operators need a very good<br />

knowledge of the agents and the devices used to identify them. Operators have to be particularly knowledgeable about the<br />

limitations of tools they are using to avoid producing wrong results.<br />

The degree or dose of contamination of persons should also be diagnosed on-site. This would expedite triage and allow<br />

medical staff to begin treatment as early as possible.<br />

Easy-to-use tools must be developed to provide enhanced situational awareness, needed for prioritizing resources,<br />

developing response plans, reducing vulnerabilities, and mitigating consequences. These instruments should have integrated<br />

communication systems to allow instantaneous support by off -site experts, e.g. in the interpretation of results. All decision<br />

makers should be kept informed.<br />

CBRN incidents are not just local events. To manage such an event successfully, a fast and effi cient co-operation of many diff erent<br />

agencies at the local, national, and often international level is crucial. To achieve this, fi rst responders need to adopt a joint doctrine<br />

<strong>ESRIF</strong> FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: CBRN

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