I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

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SEAMLESS TRACKING /
TRACING/LOCALISATION
OF VEHICLES, CRAFTS
AND GOODS/
CONTAINERS
HIGH-PERFORMANCE
SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES
INFORMATION
ASSURANCE
Advanced manned/autonomous platforms (aerial/naval/ground-/space-based)
Wide-area and localised surveillance of air/sea/land transportation networks
Multi-sensor networks
Data-fusion and cognitive correlation of intelligence/sensor feed
Secure remote IDing of vehicles, crafts and goods/containers
Remote health-monitoring/ status query capability
Remote, mobile and high-throughput capable hazmat sensors (CBRNE) in passenger
and bulk-freight/goods environments
Crowd monitoring and suspicious behaviour analysis tools
Continuous enhancement of existing scanning technologies (e.g. radar, IR, visual etc.)
and instruments
Continuous improvement of encryption technologies
INCIDENT RESPONSE Advanced common situational/operational picture generation and dissemination
Autonomous damage assessment and mitigation
Autonomous incident detection and alarming
Adaptive modelling and simulation tools for incident eff ect extrapolation, tied in to
control room systems
FUTURE AWARENESS Assessment of future, possible transportation system characteristics and security
requirements (i.e. sub-orbital fl ight etc.)
2.3.5 Power Generation, Transmission and Storage (incl. oil and gas supplies)
Power generation, transmission and storage will, due to their spatially dispersed nature, have to focus on reactive measures to
increase resilience and assure service provision. Since we assume no large-scale investment in distribution and transmission lines
to happen, while demand may still increase despite consumption-reduction initiatives, the immediate dispersal of overloads
due to lines going down will be a necessity. This does not denigrate preventive measures, such as the absolutely necessary
capability to «dynamically island» power distribution lines to avoid cascading eff ects or the need for better harmonisation
procedures across frequency areas (under-/over frequency) in getting grids on-line again. Again, such a centralised system is
only manageable with a powerful IT backbone infrastructure, requiring stringent measures in ICT security; this is particularly
the case where internet access is facilitated by local power grids. Furthermore, the use of modern technologies and services
(like smart grids based on public telecommunication channels, street/traffi c light control over the internet, facilitating internet
access by local power grids, etc.) requires special attention to very specifi c security aspects, particularly considering that
these technologies often directly connect to the basic supply systems of European societies. The trend towards autonomous,
decentralised power generation, even home-based micro-generation, can off set this, though, and would contribute to
systemic resilience. This, in turn, can serve to reduce European dependency upon dwindling and potentially politically usable
natural resources, such as coal and gas. Naturally, this will mean that eff orts put into the development of substitutes and other
power generation technologies have a security impact.
Larger power generation sites will still need to be protected, particularly nuclear processing sites. This goes beyond a set of «good
practices», requiring a mix of state-of-the-art surveillance, verifi cation and protective means, such as e.g. using smart materials in
construction. With most of the European energy market in (semi-) private hands, thus being subject to a business paradigm that
is not naturally inclined to include maximum security will require market models that go beyond those currently in existence as
well as a consistent legal and regulatory framework throughout Europe. In general, for prevention and preparedness purposes,
extensive multidisciplinary simulation and risk/vulnerability/eff ects assessment tools will be necessary.
Signifi cant gaps were identifi ed in the prevention of chain eff ects throughout an ageing infrastructure, the cascading of
adverse eff ects into other critical infrastructures (e.g. aff ecting telecommunications via SCADA systems), and, most importantly,
ESRIF FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Security of Critical Infrastructures