I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
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8.2.1.4 Citizens’ trust in identifi cation systems<br />
A key link in the chain of trust is the users’ trust in identity systems. With identity systems managing very sensitive and private<br />
data for millions of people (especially for government systems) we must ensure that the systems are secure and well defi ned<br />
to protect against key threats such as identity theft..<br />
One of the often overlooked factors in trust is communication and it is important that the users of any identifi cation system are<br />
provided with clear explanations of how their data is going to be used and the purpose of such use. It is well established that<br />
the public’s concerns with regard to biometrics are around a lack of knowledge of the technology and mistrust of organizations<br />
that deploy and manage biometric applications. Most people are unaware of what biometric systems can and cannot do<br />
and draw no distinction between non-intrusive and potentially intrusive implementations —rendering it diffi cult to make<br />
informed decisions about a particular case.<br />
For all these reasons, training for users and operators is crucial to the success of the new systems. If the training and<br />
communication around new projects is not done properly, people will not trust the systems and therefore not use them or<br />
potentially use them improperly which could lead to security breaches.<br />
8.2.2 Identifi cation management in a faster moving world<br />
8.2.2.1 Fast identifi cation of travellers<br />
Many of today’s border management organizations and processes are not structured or ready to meet the new challenges<br />
with which they are faced. Consistent and strategic coordination across border management agencies is often lacking and<br />
information is fragmented or maintained in information silos. As a result valuable information is not always available to the<br />
decision makers to whom it could make a diff erence.<br />
Therefore individuals are able to cross borders without being subjected to the appropriate level of scrutiny.<br />
Tragic events such as the September 11 attacks in the United States and the bombings in Madrid and London are stark reminders<br />
of the potential consequences of a single mistaken decision. Managing all of these challenges in a cost effi cient manner, while<br />
communicating adequately to the public and conveying a commitment to protect privacy, are the key challenges for today’s<br />
border management professionals.<br />
Border control typically presents the following characteristics:<br />
Operated at the border station, without mobile equipment<br />
Processed when the traveller arrives at the border without proactive controls<br />
Control stations are connected to police databases, but do not use all capabilities given by Passenger Name Records (PNR)<br />
and Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) data<br />
Our purpose is to show the opportunity of a reasonable investment, in architectural terms, to move the border controls from<br />
reactive to proactive: people are fl ying and are expected in a few hours, therefore one has time to process the controls and to<br />
select who should be controlled more accurately.<br />
Such proactive systems will require a connection to the information systems of airlines (through companies operating fl ights<br />
or through a special secure connection). This way, border control authorities would browse data concerning people following<br />
arrival, and select only those who need a more precise control at the border after having queried their national databases and<br />
the Schengen Information System (SIS or SIS II). All other passengers can cross the border easily and quickly.<br />
A new global scheme could integrate three levels of identity controls:<br />
At origin/in transit: the details of the traveller are collected and sent to the destination. This will help focusing the eff orts<br />
on travellers most susceptible to being a threat to the destination country. Furthermore, with this approach it will even be<br />
possible to deny the boarding of travellers who would be denied entry at the destination.<br />
<strong>ESRIF</strong> FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Identifi cation of People and Assets