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a common European idea of security research but lead to the development of separate national thematic references for
security research (coordination). It could be argued that Sweden and the UK are countries in which questions that are in public
opinion and policy framed as security questions are very close related to the normative foundations of statehood, refl ecting
threats to the idea of the state as a collective security provider (Sweden: integration of information from diff erent sources for
fi rst-responder emergency actions; UK: responding to citizens’ fear of conventional crime/violence and terrorist attacks), thus
resulting in a predominance of national themes, however mirrored by an interest in implementing these themes along with
emerging European/international standards, as well as making use of international knowledge and practices.
Austria and Spain represent cases in which the eff ect of model-I and model-II cultural factors is just opposite – and in which
cultural factors in sum have a negative eff ect on security (research) governance. Normative values were found to contribute
to reducing gaps, as both countries have a public culture that fosters the idea of making public choices on the basis of
pluralistic assessments and with a view of the functioning of the social/political system as a whole. Styles of developing
knowledge and interpretation (giving political meaning to facts) were found to have in sum an amplifying eff ect on gaps
in both countries. In Austria, the tradition and structure of consocialism and consensus democracy limits the potential
for developing shared European understandings on security problems and agree on a common interpretation of the
value/seriousness of security challenges; the interpretation of security as a task of the level of the state organization as a
whole limits the development of internationally comparable security strategies. It can also be expected to limit the social
acceptance of international solutions for security problems, not (re-)designed to national needs. In Spain, normative ideal of
security based on and contributing to innovation does not open up space for a promotion of comprehensive international
solutions and convergence of security (research) strategies, as it is mainly interpreted in national terms of science and
technology. At the same time, Spain typically uses EU institutions to promote its own agenda and to seek support for own
positions. This tendency is however limited by mistrust against other security cultures rooted in the countries politicals
culture, which is marked by an aversion against “security”, resluting from remembrances of repressive security state in
charge of public order.
France and Germany are cases in which model-III cultural factors (symbolism and associated practices) were found to reduce
gaps. National characteristics of security lead to the perception of security problems as having a generically transnational
and international character. Security is at the same time seen as a symbol of preserving the values acquired by the society as
a whole. In France, security has become a symbol for crisis management in a broad sense, independent from the source of
origin. In Germany, security has become a symbol of preparedness and ability for defence of the nation against threats from
without and from within. Both need additional legitimacy from higher-ranking, international values, such as democracy, rule
of law and European integration. This background of political culture explains the potential for establishing comparability
between national and European security strategies and call for a more comprehensive approach on a European level. It
however needs to be added that in the case of Germany, model-III cultural factors were also found to have exacerbating
eff ects on gaps. This has to be understood in the fi rst place as an eff ect of the German idea of a protective state (in the wake
of the enlightened-absolutist public policy tradition of “gute polizey” in the 18th century), responsive to the specifi c security
requirements of its citizens.
Model-II cultural factors, relating to knowledge structures and styles of interpretation, were found in France and Germany to in
sum cause/widen gaps, just as they were in Austria and Spain. France’s “sûreté” tradition/culture e.g. causes on overemphasis
on the societal (as opposed to the technical) dimension, thus limiting potential for convergence of security research on a
European level and causing incompatibility with the majority of national and European security (research) strategies with
their focus on technical solutions to security problems. Germany’s interpretation of security as a task on the level of the
state organization as a whole/as a government matter in the sense of civil protection sets constraints on a comprehensive
approach both on a national and on a European level. It also limits acceptability of coordination with other national and
European-level research programmes, or at least the perception of such coordination as useful for solutions to security
problems on a national scale.
10.3.1.6 Association of the Four Cultural Factors Identifi ed Gaps/Challenges
Summarized oval all countries analysed (see matrix 4, annex 2), cultural factors have the strongest evidence of positive impact
on (developing) a comprehensive approach at the national level; they have the strongest evidence of negative impact on splits
ESRIF FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: The governance and coordination