I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

enhanced research eff orts need to focus on the importance of, and the attainment of, institutional integration as an essential
pre-requisite for information fusion both within the state and between states.
Power generation, transmission and distribution systems, operated mostly by private market actors, need
to be made more resilient, this will become even more important as off shore wind, wave and tidal resources
are exploited. While parts of this are a short term question (investment), research should be done into sensible and
hardened interoperability schemes countering cascading and chaining eff ects while enabling rapid re-establishment of
service provision («dynamic islanding», self-healing systems, etc.), dependency-diversifi cation (more and smaller sites and
sources) and determinants of economical feasibility. This is in line with the crucial importance of power supply for Crisis
Management, as outlined by WG4.
Regulation/Legislation
Clearly defi ned areas of responsibility and better and more eff ective interaction and cooperation are needed
between private CI operators and public regulatory and law enforcement agencies, especially across borders. This refers
particularly to regulatory frameworks, which need clear delineations (for operational crisis management conclusions, see
chapter WG4; for law enforcement agencies, see chapter WG1).
The domain of Critical Infrastructure Protection is a strong and nationally regulated market of public and private actors.
Investment is, whether partially or sector dependent, driven by legislative requirements rather than market forces. This has
two implications: a) That similar regulations should harmoniously apply throughout Europe in order to achieve and
guarantee comparable preparedness levels within this framework, and b) that new ways of incentivising innovation
need to be found.
The importation of goods and services from non-EU countries requires policy and regulatory frameworks. It should
protect local environments, populations and industries in the countries of origin from exploitation in the service of
economic gain.
2.6.3 Sensors, Tracing and ID Management
The broad application of sensors from wide area maritime surveillance to very local tracking of suspicious individuals
or screening massive amounts of passengers/goods for CBRNE threats, are an absolute necessity in Europe’s societies
and their continued improvement should be considered an ongoing requirement. These capabilities need to be
developed (where missing), improved upon (where they exist) and networked for validation/triangulation, thus providing
crucial added value to security end-users and operators. In combination with high computation power, cognitive correlation
methodologies and multi-sensor networks, this will provide very real added value to security end-users and operators (for
specifi c implications, see chapter WG3, 4, 7 and 8).
This directly aff ects the aspect of identifi cation/authentication and access/control rights. We need better
background checks for use throughout Europe, a concept of secure e-ID, trusted providers, better encryption, etc. The
area of mass transportation of people and goods will ever more be in need of contactless/standoff scanners
that are reliable, fast and broad in scope. This refers to the scanning of people (biometrics, identifi cation, data
mining, international cooperation in data provision, etc.) as well as hazardous materials, non-metallic materials
and especially CBRNE detection (e.g. innovative use of Roman spectroscopy or LIDAR - Light Detection and Ranging).
New technologies (e.g. terahertz technologies) need to be continually envisaged, developed and evaluated in line with
our understanding of evolving threats; improved, tested and spiralled into security use. WG2 would also propose that
a fundamental review of the current regulatory regimes in the aviation and maritime industries be undertaken and
research carried out to determine the eff ectiveness of measures as well as the appropriateness of current and emerging
technologies in this area. In the context of societal resilience, trust, security and society, it would be useful to determine
what, if any, measures could be removed and under which circumstances (see WG 6, 8).
Water and food supplies, as well as agriculture, maritime and health infrastructures are particularly vulnerable
to bio-agent contamination, be it man-made (deliberate or accidental) or natural in origin. We need fast, reliable and
widely applicable biosensors, constantly available reactive health services, pharmaceuticals and well established crisis
management capabilities across environments. Communication and, in particular, the role of the media require much
research in this key area (see also chapters WG4, 6, 11).
Food supplies and agricultural systems need to be put on a resilient preventive footing. This requires good regulation and
biosensors (mentioned above), but also traceability and tamper-proof seals throughout the supply chain.
85