I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
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which members of a society orient their action and which are a kind of software for operating interfaces between actors (e.g.<br />
EU Member States) and overarching structures (i.e. <strong>European</strong> institutions for security research coordination and governance).<br />
The cultural key to the functioning of such interfaces is seen a system of symbols that is fl exible enough to refl ect and adapt to<br />
new threats and challenges. A seminal author is Robert Wuthnow. For example, a country that has a security culture centred on<br />
prevention and foresight as the symbol for security will have normative diffi culty to engage in security research coordination<br />
centred on response/reaction and to accept topics such as civil protection as elements of a <strong>European</strong> security (research) agenda.<br />
A fourth school (model IV) conceives of culture as action repertories, that is individual (or proprietary), experience-based<br />
strategies associated to individual attributions of meaning and normative convictions. This concept is strong in explaining<br />
how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies<br />
and courses of action being allotted to defi ned goals. A seminal author is Ann Swidler. Applied to security research governance<br />
analysis, cultural factors defi ned in terms of action repertories may best explain why EU Member States adapt diff erently to<br />
similar security threats and may also implement commonly defi ned security capabilities plans and research coordination<br />
strategies in divergent ways. Coordination for example may be implemented by <strong>European</strong>ization (development of or adherence<br />
to common standards on the EU level) or by a national joined-up interagency approach.<br />
The four approaches/models can be classifi ed along to two axes, as shown in annexes as<br />
Table: Four models of analysis of cultural factors and examples from the fi eld of security research governance<br />
Culture as a factor in the perception/defi nition of threa<br />
vs.<br />
Culture as a factor in the response to threat.<br />
and<br />
Cultural factors infl uencing the thematic thrust of national security research programmes (e.g. prevention/preparedness vs.<br />
reaction/response; technology vs. society)<br />
vs.<br />
Cultural factors infl uencing the national approach to security (research) governance (e.g. national inter-agency coordination<br />
vs. international standardisation).<br />
WG 10 fi ndings have, as noted in the introduction, revealed the following gaps and need for coordination:<br />
Building potential for a comprehensive approach at the national level<br />
Building potential for a comprehensive approach at the <strong>European</strong> level<br />
Overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs.<br />
standardisation), including the improvement of coordination of national security research and foresight activities with<br />
<strong>European</strong>-level research programmes<br />
Overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour technological solutions to<br />
security problems)<br />
10.3.1.4 Assignment of Evidence for each of the Four Big Cultural Factors (models I-IV) per country to the Four Identifi ed Gaps/Challenges<br />
In matrix 1 of the attached analytical sheet (annex IV, annex 2), these identifi ed gaps and coordination issues are associated with<br />
cultural factors according to the four models identifi ed above. Within each model, evidence for each of the four big cultural<br />
factors (model I-IV) per country is assigned the four identifi ed gaps/challenges listed on a country basis. This country-related<br />
information comes from the precedent comparative country analysis reported in the “Mid-term Threats and Challenges” paper as<br />
well as from preliminary results of the collaborative project “Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions” (CPSI) from the<br />
FP7-SEC-2007-1 call.<br />
“+” in front of an entry in matrix 1 means that the respective political/structural/cultural facture is conducive to meeting the<br />
respective challenge/narrowing the respective gap.<br />
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