23.10.2013 Views

I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

174<br />

In parallel, with the development of eID cards, the concept of an electronic signature (eSignature) is also emerging. An eSignature<br />

can be defi ned as any legally recognized electronic means that indicates that a person adopts the contents of an electronic<br />

message. It is another strong pillar of a trustworthy information society. However, the variety of means by which eSignature<br />

can be implemented make its generalization complicated. A <strong>European</strong> directive, published in 1999, could be used as a starting<br />

point to develop new eSignature standards in order to address the crucial cross-border interoperability challenges.<br />

Trust in Internet payments<br />

A large number of credit cards holders claim misuse via ID theft of other means through their credit card. There have been<br />

improvements in security in this area with some measures being standardised – for example the use of smart cards and card<br />

Pins or password protection. However, these do not prevent the use of cards by unauthorised persons if the user is not very<br />

careful with the way s/he types-in the code. The integration of biometrics to grant access to the card information is a solution.<br />

Besides, linking the user’s credit card and mobile phone may add signifi cant trust.<br />

A key challenge is to provide a next generation payment mechanism, available on internet (but also in any mall or shopping<br />

area), based on a PIN code, a signature or a digit sequence, but with strong authentication of the user’s identity to ensure trust<br />

and security.<br />

8.2.1.2 Trust in biometric systems<br />

What you are vs. what you have<br />

Given the demand for strong identity assurance, biometric technologies have a unique potential, by off ering the “gold<br />

standard” of true three-factor authentication. The fi rst two factors, “something you know” and “something you have”, can<br />

be satisfi ed by traditional username / password / token means – but only biometrics can off er the fi nal third factor of<br />

“something you are”. This provides a level of control in identity management that has never been reached before by any<br />

other technology and therefore, the trust in the identity management systems is dramatically increased both for the users<br />

and the authorities. However, we will see that there are areas that remain to be improved if we are to avoid undermining<br />

the strength of biometric systems.<br />

Biometric data protection is key to trust<br />

Biometric data protection, acquired by enhancing a system’s robustness, is a most crucial requirement for a system to be<br />

trusted. There are mainly two classes of attacks, by which an attacker can breach the security of a biometric system or fool the<br />

system to gain access to the biometric data of a legitimate user:<br />

External attacks: the attacker tries to fool the acquisition device by showing a fake image (like a copy of a fi ngerprint of a<br />

legitimate user). Such attacks can be prevented with appropriate anti spoofi ng mechanisms.<br />

Internal attacks: the attacker is able to retrieve the template of a genuine user that has already enrolled onto the system.<br />

This can be done by spoofi ng the system while the legitimate user uses the system or by hacking the database where<br />

the biometrics are stored or simply by access not being adequately protected or restricted. The attacker then injects the<br />

template directly into the matching algorithm. This solution is more complex to implement as the attacker needs to interfere<br />

with components within the system perimeter.<br />

Due to such threats, biometric data of citizens must be protected to a high level. This issue is addressed by the Personal<br />

Data Protection legislation but further measures or standards for secure deployment are required. A strict application of the<br />

Directive is very important since stealing or spoofi ng of biometric user characteristics, may lead to a “permanent” fake identity<br />

ownership or identity theft. We need improved security to protect the biometric data used in our systems. Some people are<br />

considering user behaviour as a kind of biometric identifi cation.<br />

The building of user profi les deduced from user behaviour in his/her interaction with an application may provide meaningful<br />

information to detect abnormal user operations and thus, potential identity theft. It is a major challenge in the mid-term to<br />

build and evaluate appropriate counter-measures.<br />

Research should focus on evaluating performance and robustness of counter-measures related to internal and external attacks<br />

and, if required, as well on profi ling<br />

<strong>ESRIF</strong> FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Identifi cation of People and Assets

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!