I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
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medical counter-measures, decontamination, and protection. It is also essential to consider how <strong>European</strong> societies can<br />
overcome an attack involving CBRN weapons and still sustain social cohesion and stability.<br />
It is relatively unlikely that a non-EU state will attack the EU using CBRN weapons. However, it should be noted that, due to dualuse<br />
technological developments, non-EU states that have engaged in off ensive CBRN programs in the past will increasingly<br />
possess a stand-by CBRN capability.<br />
6.2.2 CBRN security deployment in the mid- to long-term perspectives (20 years)<br />
This part of the summary analyses key technological development trends that will contribute to the development and<br />
deployment of CBRN weapons and materials in the mid- to long-term perspectives, defi ned as 20 years into the future.<br />
6.2.2.1 Developments in chemical dual-use technology<br />
The ever-increasing range of toxic chemicals and the new processes that enable the synthesis of such chemicals on scales of a<br />
few tens of kilograms make it easier to use chemical substances off ensively. New methods of manufacture will have an impact<br />
on the ability to produce either classical warfare chemicals or other toxic chemicals. Many parts of the chemical industry<br />
around the world operate with multipurpose batch facilities, which can readily switch from one product to another. This<br />
versatility provides the means to produce a wide variety of chemicals on which the world depends to sustain a modern way of<br />
life, but it could also be misdirected to produce chemical warfare agents. In the future, technology now considered advanced<br />
will become available to a wider community, including those that have malignant purposes.<br />
A wide range of new reactor technologies including phase-transfer catalysis, microwave reactors, and electrochemistry are<br />
worth mentioning. Some of these process technologies can be scaled down to sizes that could be operated inconspicuously<br />
outside a normal chemical production setting. The potential off ensive use seems obvious, although some diffi culties in<br />
producing chemical weapon agents in a “backyard” setting still exist.<br />
Small reactors fabricated by technology adapted from the micro-electronics industry can be surprisingly productive when<br />
operated continuously. With technologies such as microreactors becoming more widely used in industry, scaling up benchtop<br />
production processes is much easier and faster. Biotechnology will steadily increase in importance, especially the<br />
manufacture of (complex) organic chemicals. Enzyme-catalyzed reactions as well as reactions in more complex biological<br />
media are alternatives to more conventional syntheses.<br />
As concerning means of delivery and dispersal, various technological developments can have implications for more effi cient<br />
delivery of chemical weapons. Nanotechnology, for example, can be used in many ways, one being the use of particles as carriers<br />
of toxic agents, enabling aerosols to be transported easily through protective clothing and/or deep into lungs or skin.<br />
The widespread use of unmanned aerial or ground vehicles indicates the coming of age of remotely piloted vehicle technology.<br />
While much of the technology associated with cruise missiles is controlled, the sophistication of what is available commercially<br />
is growing rapidly and therefore could get into the hands of terrorists in the future.<br />
Another factor is the development of the binary weapon in which the agent is stored as two precursor chemicals that only<br />
need to be combined to form the fi nal lethal product. This reduces the risk that a terrorist must face in the storage and<br />
transport of their weapons. It also reduces the threat of accidental exposure upon dispersion of the agent. If the chemical<br />
device is engineered correctly, with some sort of time delay, the terrorist could be long gone before the lethal agent is made.<br />
6.2.2.2 Developments in biological dual-use technology<br />
The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force in 1975. The disclosure of off ensive weapons programs<br />
after it entered into force, consisting of highly advanced molecular biology research creating agents with new characteristics<br />
for off ensive purposes, points to the potential for further misuse of biotechnology.<br />
Today many biotechnological techniques are widely used and spread throughout the scientifi c community. Although the<br />
methodology for modifying most bacteria and viruses to change their characteristics is quite easy depending on which organism<br />
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