I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
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10.3 Findings & Gaps<br />
This section presents the real situation of “Governance and Co ordination” based on the assessment of Member States’ policy<br />
and practice.<br />
The ability (or lack thereof ) to develop a shared understanding of Security, to overcome traditional national interpretations<br />
and frameworks for assessing security problems and solutions, and the existence (or lack) of a political cognitive construction<br />
(conceptual frame of reference) of a common <strong>European</strong> security space is the strongest political/structural/cultural factor that<br />
explains for a country:<br />
The potential (negative and positive) for a comprehensive approach at the national level<br />
The lack of potential for a comprehensive approach at the <strong>European</strong> level<br />
The success or failure in overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security<br />
governance (co ordination vs. standardisation), including the improvement of co ordination of national security research<br />
and foresight activities with <strong>European</strong>-level research programmes<br />
The success or failure in overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology), with a tendency to favour<br />
technological solutions to security problems)<br />
These fi ndings support the assumption that the development of a shared understanding of the concept of security is<br />
generally at the core of security research governance and co ordination. It also means that security research governance and<br />
co ordination founded on structural similarities can be disrupted by lack of a shared understanding of the concept of security<br />
or, for example, diff erent strategies to give political meaning to technical questions of security.<br />
10.3.1 Cultural Factors associated with Security Research Governance Gaps<br />
10.3.1.1 Scope & Objective<br />
This study provides an analysis of national cultural/structural/political factors which are associated the following status and gaps<br />
in EU Member States (including one non-member but FP7 participating state) security research governance; the identifi cation<br />
of these is among the fi ndings of previous analyses undertaken in the framework of <strong>ESRIF</strong> Working Group 10:<br />
Maintaining <strong>European</strong> security is complex and requires a comprehensive approach both at national and <strong>European</strong> level<br />
EU Member States’ governments do not have a comparable set of security strategies or priorities to address adequately the<br />
current security challenges Europe faces<br />
National security research and foresight activities are not adequately coordinated with the <strong>European</strong>-level research programs<br />
resulting in gaps and overlap between activities<br />
There is a split in approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardisation) and a majority focus on technical<br />
solutions to security problems<br />
Political factors, even beyond typical political culture, are often associated with cultural factors: National perception styles<br />
determine which issues are seen as security relevant and where legislation and/or development of national capabilities to<br />
meet challenges is necessary; culturally embedded norms aff ect countries’ approaches to the development security solutions<br />
(national, pooled or common <strong>European</strong> capabilities); culturally rooted values attached to the concept of the nation state<br />
determine to which extend national research policy is open to international standardisation or is in contrast concentrated on<br />
national coordination of relevant domestic bodies and agencies; etc.<br />
10.3.1.2 Methodology<br />
The methodology applied here rests on the “cultural theory of risk” (e.g. Mary Douglas/Aaron Wildavsky: Risk and Culture (Berkeley,<br />
CA et al.: University of California Press, 1982). This theory assumes that diff erent perceptions and disputes about risk and security<br />
can be linked to competing worldviews: conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the<br />
organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are selected as important because this reinforces established<br />
interpretations and relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community. Among other “texts”<br />
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