I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

2. Supply chain risks: The terrorist has the objective to misuse the transport supply chain as their means to create damage
or fatalities. The transport elements are in this case not the target but the means (used to transport weapons or as weapons
themselves, in particular if we consider dangerous freight).
8.2.3 Interoperability and information sharing
8.2.3.1 Interoperability of systems
As we invest in new technologies and systems, it is vital to ensure they achieve their full potential. To that end we need to move
beyond the “stove-pipe systems” and ensure the systems can work together in an interoperable fashion. These changes which
our national and international systems are undergoing are groundbreaking. Our current lack of planning and information sharing
must be addressed so we can improve effi ciency in our systems and massively improve the current lack of user satisfaction.
If we deal with these key management issues at an early stage we can build security into a system from the start rather than
making alterations when we realise the problems.
Traditionally, identity systems were established for one purpose and there was little or no information sharing. However, new
systems, for example border and immigration systems which are now at the vanguard of national, regional and global security
need to share and exchange information in a quick and reliable manner. Achieving this will enable systems to process travellers
more effi ciently on fast track programmes and an early detection of persons of interest.
Information sharing falls into three main categories:
Cross-programme: Within a given agency, there may be a need to share information between projects or programmes (e.g.
between visa issuance and asylum systems).
Cross-agency: Within a government, a need generally exists to share information between departments or agencies (e.g.
between border control and law enforcement).
International: Allied nations, regional pacts, or bilateral agreements frequently necessitate the exchange of data between countries.
Interoperability is crucial to the success of any data exchange. Interoperability requires many elements to be successful:
technical, architectural, interface, formatting, security and last but not least policy. In particular, a traceability and control of
database access and interconnections should be well-defi ned starting with the system conception.
Certifi cation of the systems is one means to achieve better interoperability or the development of standards as has been done
in recent years with the ICAO standards on passports. However, one needs to be vigilant as these now interoperable systems
need to be protected against their own inherent vulnerabilities. Ultimately, a lack of system interoperability will limit these new
systems and undermine the sophisticated purposes for which they are required.
As far as standards are concerned our continued failure to agree on certain matters and put in place all required standards
(for example fi ngerprint template interoperability) continues to hold up our ability to exploit and maximise our use of
available and new technologies. Also it hinders innovation and R&D as developers still do not have roadmaps for all
requirements as yet.
8.2.3.2 Tracking international movement of assets
There is no single system governing all the international movements of assets; in fact, freight transport is characterised by
complex interactions among multiple actors, industries, regulatory agencies, modes, operating systems, liability regimes, legal
frameworks, etc. Actors involved are numerous, disparate in nature and activity, operate on tight margins, and, as a result,
represent more of a security risk than their larger counterparts further down the chain (i.e. large airport, port and maritime
transport operators).
Cross-network optimisation of security measures is extremely diffi cult. Each component of the system has tended to seek to
optimise its own operations and, in some cases, ensure that these are compatible with the next link in the chain. However,
it is a well-known tenet in logistics management that the aggregation of individually optimised links leads to a suboptimal
logistics chain. Un-harmonised or inexistent security practices, incompatible operating and information management systems,
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