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Moreover, surveillance tools for detection of off ensive capacity need to be in place; emphasis should be on emerging
technologies with dual-use potential, identifying important, unique, and detectable indicators for CBRN terrorism. This also
involves mapping disincentives and thresholds for choosing CBRN agents as violent means.
A related capability gap is the (knowledge of ) awareness of stakeholders about the threat. This includes the need for national
and international information exchange, e.g. sharing of scenarios, reports, incident database, and harmonisation of import/
export regulations. Development of advanced modelling and simulation tools in the form of so-called “serious games” showing
the potential of real-world CBRN-related scenarios would be extremely useful for both insight and training.
6.3.1.2 Generic methods for risk assessment and information management
There is a need for generic methods for risk assessment and adaptive information management on newer, mostly small-scale,
threats. In this sense, ESRIF WG6 identifi ed capability gaps on integration of information coming out of detection networks,
intelligence, and dispersion modelling. Integrated information (CBRN situational awareness) must be fed into decision support
tools and integrated into command and control.
This implies a need for modelling capabilities for attack simulation and intervention planning taking place at numerous incident
sites (in/out-door, urban, sub-urban, rural, industrial, infrastructure). Related gaps are on forecasting of incident propagation;
health evolvement of exposed persons; dispersion modelling tools in urban environments and complicated assets such as
airports, harbours, and big events; and development of 3D maps of high-level targets.
On a higher abstraction level there is a need to develop tools to calculate the impact (also higher order) of CBRN attack
employing metrics other than casualties (e.g. psychosocial impact or economical impact).
6.3.1.3 Intelligent database analysis and sharing capabilities
Improvement of risk management requires that EU member states agree on a number of offi cial planning scenarios to be the
basis for further planning and policy. As part of this, identifi cation of agents that have the potential to be used for malicious
purposes as well as the consequences of such incidents is required. For this purpose, intelligent databases of agents and of
delivery means must be designed. These should be capable of identifying and analyzing agents and assessing their potential
for being misused. Based on yet-to-be-established priorities, qualitative and quantitative agent hazard characterization must
be performed. Descriptions of chemical, biological, and radioactive sources used in normal operations (e.g. industry, medicine,
research) should contain, as a minimum, the following characteristics: physical-chemical composition, intended use, risk
classifi cation, and images. This implies the need to be able to synthesize or culture highly toxic or highly virulent agent, to
handle and characterize agents and to investigate and predict toxicity and virulence. All activities associated with establishing
these characteristics must be subject to strict security guidelines.
Vulnerability assessments should be conducted based on the development of approved scenarios in order to assess the state
of preparedness and protection to low-impact incidents, which may nevertheless cause signifi cant psychological, health, and
economic eff ects. Further, sets of focused scenarios at EU level, including events with cross-border eff ects and prediction of
agent distribution of a variety of CBRN agents are needed. General risks and vulnerabilities should be communicated to all
involved in planning and response and not kept in the hands of security offi cials only.
6.3.2 Prevention
6.3.2.1 Multinational counter-proliferative organisational measures
The best defence against CBRN terrorist threats, next to eliminating the cause, is to prevent extremists from having the
availability to CBRN agents and knowledge. An ideal future within the multinational arena would be to envision legally binding
global treaties as well as agreements on export control of sensitive technologies, materials, and knowledge. This, together with
nationally implemented non-proliferation measures, would create a solid base for preventing access to CBRN materials and
knowledge. The importance of international treaties for limiting proliferation of materials and knowledge to non-state actors
should not be under-estimated.
ESRIF FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: CBRN