I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

Identifi ed capability gaps are the requirements for taking a multinational approach towards increased security of CBRNrelated
infrastructure, not only by states negotiating international treaties but also involving industry, academia, and research
institutes. A global awareness of the dual-use potential associated with the CBRN area needs to be achieved in order to reduce
proliferation of dual-use knowledge, equipment, and materials from R&D institutions, industry, and hospitals. In addition, a
global commitment is needed for controlling and facilitating implementation and global adherence to CBRN regulations and
international conventions.
The fast speed of new technical development within the civilian R&D community demands an ability to perform technical
assessments, focusing on the dual-use dilemma. A scientifi c advisory board, preferably governed by an international treaty,
could potentially achieve this, which, in turn, would lead to better and more fl exible coverage of emerging threats in future
CBRN-related treaties. One such issue of concern is the possible misuse of non-lethal weapons where support by treaties and
diplomacy is needed.
6.3.2.2 Counter-measures and limitation of terrorist capabilities
Enhancing border and domestic security operations is prerequisite for the prevention of CBRN attacks by non-state actors.
Terrorist threats can be mitigated by preventing extremists from entering EU territory or illicitly transporting materials,
components, and devices across our borders. Within EU borders unlawful access to materials and attempts to acquire,
transport, and use these materials must be prevented. Ideally, the aim of EU would be to have full control of CBRN material and
precursors as well as delivery systems to prevent illegitimate uses of the knowledge and materials.
Capability gaps that need to be addressed in this respect include improved border control of goods and people. Already
there are a signifi cant number of initiatives underway in the fi rst pillar context to ensure an eff ective common approach to
risk analysis and management by customs for security and safety purposes. A strong international cooperation is also needed
to combat illicit traffi cking and terrorist use of CBRN material by dissemination of information between national authorities
and regional and international organizations. Facility security and security checks of persons working with sensitive CBRN
issues need to be developed. Additionally, technology for identifi cation of suspected illegal CBRN laboratories and production
facilities are lacking today.
6.3.3 Preparedness
Preparedness covers many aspects but the main capability gaps identifi ed are in the area of measures that should be in place to
monitor the possible illegal attempt to use CBRN material for terrorism purposes and intercept it before the attack occurs. In this
respect, there is a major diff erence between chemical and biological from one side and radiological/nuclear on the other side. For
C and B current detection techniques require an interaction with the material, so there is a clear need to develop a viable standoff
detection capability. A major problem in the chemical fi eld derives from the broad spectrum of chemical agents to be detected. In
the biological fi eld, the challenges derive from the large variety of agents and the long time required for their identifi cation.
On the contrary, techniques for the detection of R/N materials are quite mature and widely deployed, based on a wide variety
of instruments: fi xed portals to monitor transit of people/vehicles/goods, transportable detectors installed on land/air carriers,
hand-held equipment for manned inspection. In this case, the capability gaps are mostly related to metrological limitations
of current technology. For example: large effi ciency detectors generally have poor discrimination and raise a large quantity
of innocent alarms, nuclear material can be easily shielded or masked with other legal radioactive material, R/N material is
diffi cult to detect in large volumes, and the impossibility of stand-off detection of alpha radiation.
For B and C an alternate possibility would be to replace the detection of material/agents with the detection of their eff ects/
properties: toxicity in the case of chemical or virulence for biological. For chemical toxicity detection, arrays of representative
toxicological end-points should be identifi ed and transformed into detectable signals. For detection of virulence, the fi rst steps
to take would be to defi ne proper virulence factors and derive a representative selection. Next eff orts should then be aimed
at design of measurement concepts. Such generic principles are not applicable to R/N because detection of radiation does
not point necessarily to a threat/illegal material due to the large variety of innocent/legal materials containing radioactivity.
Another gap specifi c for a biological incident is the lack of mobile real-time detection equipment.
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