I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission
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2.6.4 Information Technologies and Communications<br />
As outlined before, the computation power (in terms of speed and bandwidth, e.g. improvement upon quantum<br />
computer technologies, etc.) and methodology (i.e. correlation capability) needs to be continuously enhanced. At the<br />
moment, correlation/data mining methodologies are unable to keep the pace of data generation, thus hampering the<br />
benefi t of higher computation speeds. Making sense of vast amounts of data – and getting the result to security forces in<br />
the fi eld - will be key to successful security policy in the future. Plus, these systems and the internet, need to be protected<br />
from illegitimate access to data (i.e. hacking, code-breaking) by means of continuously improved encryption, and will be<br />
required on an ongoing basis.<br />
Special Emphasis in security related research should be placed on ICT security. Especially in CI, ICT infrastructure<br />
represents a core tool for communications and management; sometimes the CI is dependent on ICT infrastructure itself<br />
(CII). Indeed, our societies will continue to be extremely dependent upon technologies and computers in particular,<br />
engendering vulnerability to ICT disruption/data theft/hijacking/spoofi ng, etc. Europe therefore needs to make ICT systems<br />
more secure (i.e. multilayered ICT security).<br />
Secure and eff ective data mining and correlation methodologies and technologies need to be developed. The<br />
exponentially increasing amount of data available, plus more detailed information as sensors improve, urgently requires this<br />
capability – which is a clear gap today. We need investment in secure, high-performance and high-integrity computing in<br />
order to attain this capability.<br />
With the flow of vast amounts of information that are ideally filtered, layered and accessible comes the requirement<br />
for new man-machine interfaces that enable intuitive, rapid access to data. What is needed are interfaces that either<br />
optimise existing access and interfacing methodologies or explore novel ways and means, i.e. more effective use of<br />
visual control, voice control or direct mind-machine interfaces. The range of applications for this is immense, from<br />
systemic control and monitoring functions to command and control of security forces to cyberspace intervention<br />
and action.<br />
This ICT security related research needs to refl ect the enormous speed of ICT product lifecycles: The average<br />
today is fi ve years and the speed is accelerating. Research into solutions and migration eff orts therefore need to be equally<br />
fast, fl exible, non-bureaucratic and exploratory where no obvious solution exists. This also refers to ICT threats, which are<br />
equally rapid in evolution and require similar speeds in countermeasures. We need a culture of experimentation and<br />
WG2 strongly recommends a concentrated eff ort to monitor and extrapolate ICT developments for their positive and<br />
negative eff ects.<br />
The majority of ICT hardware commonly available is manufactured outside of Europe. A deterioration of political relations<br />
could easily result in this fl ow stopping, or hitherto unknown hardware manipulations being used against Europe. While<br />
this is a case example for a critical manufacturing capability, the importance of equipping security-essential<br />
systems with absolutely trusted hardware and software, should not be underestimated.<br />
2.6.5 Command and Control<br />
Security agencies across Europe will depend even more on rapid command and communication technologies. Current<br />
and near-future solutions are interoperable to a limited extent as their bandwidth is too low and they are neither hardened<br />
nor completely secure against software hacking. This will refl ect on network hard- and soft-wired security, protocols and<br />
control overrides. Secure, broadband professional mobile radio or software defi ned radio solutions of the next<br />
generation should be developed (e.g. cognitive radio technologies).<br />
Both public and private CI operators need to be fully aware of the state of their systems at any point in time. Therefore,<br />
the more specifi c recommendations regarding sensors, tracing and communications means need to be integrated<br />
into state of the art command and control systems that are linked to related and neighbouring systems and<br />
security services (e.g. police, crisis management, etc). This calls for technological as well as procedural and regulatory<br />
harmonisation.<br />
To better protect space assets against any kind of space-borne threat (e.g. space debris, ASAT threats, etc.), a dedicated<br />
<strong>European</strong> Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability should be developed. This not only entails developing<br />
awareness, but also enhancing controlled and autonomous evasion capabilities. Since this requirement would surpass<br />
most national capabilities, a real <strong>European</strong> added value can be achieved.<br />
The importance of the attainment of institutional integration within states and between states as a prerequisite for functional<br />
command and control demands security research into its political and societal aspects.<br />
<strong>ESRIF</strong> FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Security of Critical Infrastructures