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I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

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86<br />

2.6.4 Information Technologies and Communications<br />

As outlined before, the computation power (in terms of speed and bandwidth, e.g. improvement upon quantum<br />

computer technologies, etc.) and methodology (i.e. correlation capability) needs to be continuously enhanced. At the<br />

moment, correlation/data mining methodologies are unable to keep the pace of data generation, thus hampering the<br />

benefi t of higher computation speeds. Making sense of vast amounts of data – and getting the result to security forces in<br />

the fi eld - will be key to successful security policy in the future. Plus, these systems and the internet, need to be protected<br />

from illegitimate access to data (i.e. hacking, code-breaking) by means of continuously improved encryption, and will be<br />

required on an ongoing basis.<br />

Special Emphasis in security related research should be placed on ICT security. Especially in CI, ICT infrastructure<br />

represents a core tool for communications and management; sometimes the CI is dependent on ICT infrastructure itself<br />

(CII). Indeed, our societies will continue to be extremely dependent upon technologies and computers in particular,<br />

engendering vulnerability to ICT disruption/data theft/hijacking/spoofi ng, etc. Europe therefore needs to make ICT systems<br />

more secure (i.e. multilayered ICT security).<br />

Secure and eff ective data mining and correlation methodologies and technologies need to be developed. The<br />

exponentially increasing amount of data available, plus more detailed information as sensors improve, urgently requires this<br />

capability – which is a clear gap today. We need investment in secure, high-performance and high-integrity computing in<br />

order to attain this capability.<br />

With the flow of vast amounts of information that are ideally filtered, layered and accessible comes the requirement<br />

for new man-machine interfaces that enable intuitive, rapid access to data. What is needed are interfaces that either<br />

optimise existing access and interfacing methodologies or explore novel ways and means, i.e. more effective use of<br />

visual control, voice control or direct mind-machine interfaces. The range of applications for this is immense, from<br />

systemic control and monitoring functions to command and control of security forces to cyberspace intervention<br />

and action.<br />

This ICT security related research needs to refl ect the enormous speed of ICT product lifecycles: The average<br />

today is fi ve years and the speed is accelerating. Research into solutions and migration eff orts therefore need to be equally<br />

fast, fl exible, non-bureaucratic and exploratory where no obvious solution exists. This also refers to ICT threats, which are<br />

equally rapid in evolution and require similar speeds in countermeasures. We need a culture of experimentation and<br />

WG2 strongly recommends a concentrated eff ort to monitor and extrapolate ICT developments for their positive and<br />

negative eff ects.<br />

The majority of ICT hardware commonly available is manufactured outside of Europe. A deterioration of political relations<br />

could easily result in this fl ow stopping, or hitherto unknown hardware manipulations being used against Europe. While<br />

this is a case example for a critical manufacturing capability, the importance of equipping security-essential<br />

systems with absolutely trusted hardware and software, should not be underestimated.<br />

2.6.5 Command and Control<br />

Security agencies across Europe will depend even more on rapid command and communication technologies. Current<br />

and near-future solutions are interoperable to a limited extent as their bandwidth is too low and they are neither hardened<br />

nor completely secure against software hacking. This will refl ect on network hard- and soft-wired security, protocols and<br />

control overrides. Secure, broadband professional mobile radio or software defi ned radio solutions of the next<br />

generation should be developed (e.g. cognitive radio technologies).<br />

Both public and private CI operators need to be fully aware of the state of their systems at any point in time. Therefore,<br />

the more specifi c recommendations regarding sensors, tracing and communications means need to be integrated<br />

into state of the art command and control systems that are linked to related and neighbouring systems and<br />

security services (e.g. police, crisis management, etc). This calls for technological as well as procedural and regulatory<br />

harmonisation.<br />

To better protect space assets against any kind of space-borne threat (e.g. space debris, ASAT threats, etc.), a dedicated<br />

<strong>European</strong> Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability should be developed. This not only entails developing<br />

awareness, but also enhancing controlled and autonomous evasion capabilities. Since this requirement would surpass<br />

most national capabilities, a real <strong>European</strong> added value can be achieved.<br />

The importance of the attainment of institutional integration within states and between states as a prerequisite for functional<br />

command and control demands security research into its political and societal aspects.<br />

<strong>ESRIF</strong> FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Security of Critical Infrastructures

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