I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

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6.2 Threats and challenges
6.2.1 Present to mid-term CBRN security challenges
CBRN threats and challenges to the EU come from both states and non-state actors. These actors will have diff erent motives
to develop and potentially use CBRN threat agents against targets within the EU, and have diff erent capabilities to pursue
their goals. This threat assessment, on an unclassifi ed basis, will assess the threat to the EU from these actors, taking into
consideration some of the most important motives for acquiring these weapons and the estimated capabilities that various
actors have for developing, obtaining, and potentially using CBRN weapons.
6.2.1.1 State actors
There are states in the international community that have motives for developing and possessing CBRN weapons. States
are the actors with the best capabilities to maintain sophisticated weapons programs. This should be recognized, and so
should the fact that control over CBRN weapons in certain states could change quickly because of political unrest, sabotage,
natural disaster, etc. Furthermore, it should be recognized that, as the level of technology rises globally, especially in relation
to biotechnology, more and more states will have laboratories and production facilities that could potentially be used as
stand-by off ensive CBRN capabilities. Considerable knowledge and technology could leak from offi cial state institutions to the
«free market» due to major changes in regimes and economics of states, thus increasing the threat that state-controlled CBRN
capacities could fall into the hands of non-state actors.
On the other hand, states are probably the least likely actors to actually use CBRN weapons towards EU territory, taking
into account that states are generally rational actors that will have several constraints against the actual use of CBRN
weapons, primarily because the EU is not presently in a conflict situation where such weapons would achieve any
worthwhile objective. Nevertheless, the potential threat from states’ unconventional weapons programs against the EU
does continue to exist.
6.2.1.2 Non-state actors
Non-state actors in this context are typically terrorist organizations. These organizations are present inside and outside the EU
and, for organizations primarily based outside the EU, it will often be the case that there is cooperation with persons and/or
groups inside EU territory.
It does not seem very likely that non-state actors with traditional political or social motives such as separatism will use CBRN
weapons in an attack in the EU. However, it does seem relatively likely that non-state actors motivated by ideas that are more
apocalyptic would fi nd it attractive to construct and possibly employ a CBRN weapon. The capability to do so will depend on
several factors, such as state sponsorship, scientifi c qualifi cations, access to relevant materials, etc. Terrorists can easily obtain
particularly toxic chemicals (other than those strictly regulated by the Chemical Weapons Convention).
Use of CBRN agents has a major psychological dimension. In some cases, the objective of a non-state actor could be to simply
cause panic and fear. This objective can be achieved by small low-tech attacks that might aff ect only a limited number of
people but still cause an enormous eff ect on society (the 2001 anthrax letters in the US is one such example). Even hoaxes may
very well serve the terrorists’ aims in generating panic and disorder.
As societies become ever more resilient and resistant towards conventional terrorist attacks, the motivation for terrorists to
spend additional resources on non-conventional (i.e. CBRN) weapons will likely increase. At the same time, the availability of
relevant technology will make acquisition easier.
6.2.1.3 Refl ections
In relation to non-state actors, there is a relatively high probability that a terrorist attack involving C, B, or R-weapons will take
place in Europe over the course of the next 10-20 years. The use of N-weapons is less likely. It is critically important that the EU
address this possibility in order to be able to counter and recover from such an attack, should it occur. This should be a multifaceted
approach that includes improvement of traditional preparedness elements such as detection and analysis capabilities,
ESRIF FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: CBRN