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action. Similarly, actors may respond to positive or negative feedback regarding performance during a crisis, by drawing lessons
and modifying beliefs and practices. Actors commonly attempt to refl ect upon crisis experiences after the fact, draw lessons
for the future, and formulate reform projects on the basis of interpretations of crisis experiences. Crises present considerable
opportunities for learning, but post-crisis learning attempts are often distorted or derailed by a variety of typical social and
psychological dynamics. Can researchers identify ‘best practices’ for organisational learning and change management processes
conducive to sustainable gains of not only contingency-specifi c but also generic crisis management capacity?
11.2.1.2 Societal security and public-private partnerships
We are living in a time when borders between the public and private spheres are re-evaluated, transferred and becoming more
porous. The strain on public fi nances has underpinned an ideological change regarding what the state and the private sphere
should do and vice versa. The new public management (NPM) reform introduced a range of private sector management
instruments into the public sector. Formerly closed markets are now open for private actors in which various forms of close
and durable collaboration between public and private actors are set up. The ambiguous public-private boundary should be
scrutinised further.
The overall research question in this theme is the following: What are the democratic implications, especially concerning democratic
accountability, when the private actors take part in the public domain of the high takes sphere of safety and security?
Public domain is here defi ned as the action sphere in which public and private actors are embedded in a broader institutionalised
arena concerned with the public goods and services. How can a stronger role for for-profi t actors’ in the public domain be
democratically legitimate considering the fact that the private actors cannot be held democratically accountable for the
decisions they make? Indeed, a stronger role for the private actors in the public domain raises questions on the classic dilemma
between effi ciency and democracy or what is sometimes defi ned as the distinction between output legitimacy and input
legitimacy. It is also related to the accountability dilemma. The main justifi cation for giving the private actors an important role
in the fi eld of societal security is that this can make the society less vulnerable and hence more eff ective. However, measures
taken in order to make the society more stable and less vulnerable must also be democratically legitimate which requires
political control. Societal security lies at the very heart of the responsibilities of the state.
11.2.1.3 A shared evaluative model
Crisis management is a diffi cult task that is judged and evaluated with remarkable ease when it is all over. What is lacking is a
normative framework that spells out what we can expect from public leaders and crisis management structures in times of high
stakes, uncertainty, complexity, and urgency. Diff erences between various parts of the Union, comprised of 500 million people,
surely exist. Joint research can fi nd the common ground of shared expectations and minimum standards. Such a shared model
will help design joint capacity to manage trans-boundary crises. Failures of imagination, initiative or coordination will erode
the public credibility of the governing capacity of the Union leadership. Consequential events in Europe, aff ecting the citizens
and their common society, must not become crises of governance for the European Union.
11.2.1.4 Supporting actions
The environment of entangled dependencies, where critical functions and nodes on a national, regional and global level rely
on the actions of others, creates a necessity for a well functioning EU response and recovery system. Future trans-boundary
crisis management in the “inter-mestic” EU-domain should not risk leading to “a failure of coordination”. It is imperative to
secure in advance an ability to act eff ectively and legitimately and in concert within this new policy domain for the Union.
Establishing regular joint exercises should be a low cost but high yield investment in improved EU practices, when they matter
the most. Such training eff orts must be founded on research based knowledge, innovative technology and robust methods.
Such exercises would also highlight the need for interoperability in a technical, organisational and cultural sense. It could also
spark useful discussions on standardisation and harmonisation, which should be of interest to industry and to the science and
technology community. Gaps in knowledge, procedures and technology may be identifi ed in such scenario based exercises.
Supporting action is needed on how to enhance inter-organisational coordination through joint training programs. A research-based
program for capacity building and training needs to be established. This will improve cross-sector coordination and ensure a suffi cient
response and recovery capacity to major trans-boundary events in the Union. The goal of the training program should be to link
ESRIF FINAL REPORT - PART 2 • Working Group: Human and Societal Dynamics of Security