I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

the rapid on-lining of powered-down grid parts. This procedure is hampered by structural diff erences (frequency, ownership
etc.) that need to be overcome in the future. The systemic digestion of load spikes is still problematic and requires a long-term
solution. Therefore, incident mitigation shows huge gaps that need planned and thorough closing.
For natural gas and oil pipelines/refi neries, diff erent capabilities will be necessary. It is likely that these will be subject
to government infl uence, so a major part of securing the provision of these resources will be the political stability and
reliability of source and transit countries, thus being beyond the remit of ESRIF and the ESRIA. This is not the case however
with the infrastructure itself: Again, sites require strong access control systems, but pipelines naturally are stretched over
long distances between stopovers, often through remote areas, limiting protective capabilities and thereby requiring
backup routes and up-to-date damage mitigation methodologies. The importance of Liquefi ed Natural Gas (LNG) sites and
transportation will assumedly signifi cantly increase in importance in the next twenty years. The extreme volatility of LNG,
along with the large distances to be covered in transportation will require seamless localisation, monitoring and eff ective
mobile protection mechanisms in international environments, and high standards of technical, material and procedural
security on site. Renewable and sustainable energy sources and distribution networks will also need careful consideration
in this regard.
The main gaps identifi ed in this regard are surveillance means and proactive eff ect mitigation eff orts. No spatially available
surveillance means are in place, nor are integrity monitoring systems; eff ectively, many stretches of vital supply lines are
completely invisible to operators, their only indication of something going wrong being the fl ow stopping. Once that happens,
as fallback solutions are not readily available, the delivery of vital consumables can be endangered.
Research Needs: Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution (incl. oil and gas supplies)
RISK AND
VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGIES
RESILIENT
ARCHITECTURES DESIGN
SECURE CONSTRUCTION
AND PROTECTION
NETWORK
SURVEILLANCE
RESEARCH NEEDS
Systemic interdependence awareness (e.g. power transmission-ICT), sophisticated modelling
and simulation models to analyse and understand dependency and cascading risk
Critical generation resource dependencies and substitutes R&D
Awareness of chain and cascade eff ect enablers and barriers
Security requirement specifi cs of decentralised/dispersed power generation facilities
Security requirement specifi cs of "green" power generation (e.g. off -shore/foreign solar
farms and wind parks
Security requirement specifi cs of micro-power generation and smart metering
"Dynamic islanding" of network segments, static and flexible barriers
Hardened, resilient system control IT
Smart materials in facilities and transportation means construction (i.e. pipelines, LNG
storages and maritime transport)
Enhanced, secure energy storage means and capabilities
Advanced hard/soft site security and surveillance technologies
Enhancement of access control technologies: identifi cation, ID verifi cation, tiered access
authorisation
Wide-area and localised surveillance sensors and platforms in spatially spread power
transmission networks and transportation means (esp. maritime LNG transport
surveillance)
In-system status feedbacks and health monitoring
77