I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

in thematic thrust (such as society vs. technology-centred security research). They have almost neutral impact on (developing)
a comprehensive approach at the European level.
Knowledge and interpretation (model II) – styles to make sense of facts as they are rooted in national political culture and
reinforced by political structure are the strongest factors for better and for worse. They in sum have most country-related
evidence and almost equally often account for the existence of gaps and the potential to overcome gaps. Factors related to
knowledge and interpretation are most often associated with negative eff ects on all four types of gaps under consideration
here. In particular, they hamper the overcoming of international splits in thematic thrust. They have not however a comparable
main eff ect when it comes to overcoming gaps, playing the strongest positive role only in overcoming lacks of comparable
sets of security strategies and approaches to security governance.
Cultural practices (model IV), e.g. experienced-based (vs. model-type) strategies of coordination and consensus-making about
domestic security (research) policy alternatives, more often account for overcoming gaps than for the existence of gaps.
They in fact have the least negative eff ect and at the same time the second strongest positive eff ect (behind knowledge and
interpretation) on gaps. In particular, they increase the potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level. This
reinforces our assumption that common or compatible practices/repertories of action between states can help streamline
national approaches to security (research) governance or streamline national and European approaches even in the absence
of common normative values and a shared symbolic understanding of security on a common (European) scale. The EU should
therefore support cross-national compatibility of security capabilities as well as support standardisation and certifi cation
procedures through EU and national bodies.
Normative values (model I) (security as a societal, a technical, a European etc. value) and common symbols (model III) (e.g. are
security threats symbolized by ICT, by crime or by natural disaster etc.?) in most of the cases account for the existence of gaps.
In particular, they hamper the development of a comparable set of strategies and approaches to security governance and
integration of research. Our assumption therefore is that a lack of common normative values between states as well as a lack
of a common symbolic understanding/framing of shared normative values (e.g. counter-terrorism) reinforces gaps even if a
common basis of knowledge exists between states.
In an overall picture across all countries studies, political/structural/cultural factors typically increase the potential for a
comprehensive approach at the national level.
However, political/structural/cultural factors typically limit the potential for a comprehensive approach at the European level, for
overcoming the lack of a comparable set of security strategies and approaches to security governance (coordination vs. standardisation)
as well as for overcoming the split in thematic thrust (society vs. technology).
10.3.1.7 Policy Recommendation
EU action to enhance, support and coordinate security (research) policy of Member States should take into account that
the development of a common “culture of security” as for example advocated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) –
thus activating cultural factors in the process of policy implementation – will not necessarily facilitate harmonization of
national security (research) policies. In the majority of the countries considered here, security continues to be a national
cultural value. Common symbols and values representing security on a European level may (still) lead to divergent national
responses. They need to be preceded by a process of convergence of national practices and instruments for security
(research) governance; even more as Common symbols and values representing security on a European level may (still)
lead to divergent national responses, and cultural factors have the least impact on the gap type “comprehensive approach
at European level”.
Enhancement of nationally driven initiatives for standardisation and certifi cation, including support for already operating
multilateral strategies may be therefore a more eff ective choice for EU action. The EU should accordingly support cross-national
compatibility of security capabilities as well as aggregation and integration of standardisation and certifi cation procedures
practised by national bodies through proprietary repertories of action. This is enforced by the observation that they were
found to have the least negative and at the same time the second strongest positive eff ect on gaps.
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