I527-290 ESRIF Final Report (WEB).indd - European Commission

For the moment, improving synergies between civilian research and defence research for defence purpose is quite diffi cult
since we have borders between the diff erent pillars. However, the Lisbon treaty gives hope that these borders will progressively
disappear allowing more cooperation between EDA, EC and ESA, especially for high TRL.
Regarding the content, is possible to consider two main categories of research subjects, fi rst technologies and components
where Europe suff ers from gaps creating dependencies for civilian sectors as well as for defence sectors and, second,
downstream applications interesting both defence and security.
Current Member States Security Research could have commonalities with the principal conclusions emerging from this initial
CDP as the need for persistent intelligence to support modern knowledge-based operations in complex environments,
including full spectrum awareness, robust networks and appropriate architectures and the requirement for adaptive and coordinated
inter-agency structures in order to support a comprehensive approach to EU crisis management operations and
with some of the Initial Tranche (IT) of 12 selected actions:
IT #1: Counter Man Portable Air Defence Systems
IT #2: Computer Network Operations
IT #6: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Architecture
IT #8: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence
IT #10:Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)
IT #12: Network Enabled Capability
Various approaches can be used in order to favour synergies, the search of the best possible top-down (capability pull) and
bottom-up (technology push) compromise, notably systematizing the exploitation of civilian research for defence ends (with
the identifi cation of necessary defence complements), at the institutional level, the search for a better co-ordination between
the EDA R&T action and the FP7 Security Theme (and, possibly, in a programme explicitly seeking synergies between security
and defence R&T in the future FP8), for example by setting up mixed funding.
However, it seems difficult, presently, to go further. Nevertheless, a discussion on what could be the situation
within FP8 between the EC, the Member States, the European Council and the European Parliament would be
welcomed.
A strategic role is seen for EDA into the identifi cation of shortcomings between military capability requirements and outputs
expected from on-going developments, both civilian and defence ones. This would help identifying R&T projects in order to
fi ll these gaps. However, it was noted that EDA should not duplicate eff orts by spending resources to play a role on security
R&T activities.
Cross-cutting technologies are in a diffi cult situation since one can note that they receive less and less support. A dialogue
between EDA and other R&T stakeholders (EC, ESA, etc.) would be useful to decide which side is fi nancing identifi ed crosscutting
key technologies in order to share the funding burden while avoiding unnecessary duplication. Another role for EDA
could be the information sharing between Member States for technology watch issues.
10.4 Solutions and Priorities
This section suggests all the actions that will allow European governance and co ordination on Security Research and Innovation.
Standardisation must play a vital role for the combined operational eff ectiveness of the Security Policies of Europe/Nations/
Regions. Implementation of standards will help to:
Achieve the required levels of interoperability
Accomplish common strategic, operational and tactical tasks more eff ectively
Understand and execute command procedures
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