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Solar Energy Perspectives - IEA

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<strong>Solar</strong> <strong>Energy</strong> <strong>Perspectives</strong>: Policies<br />

So far most of the rapid growth of PV has taken place in a very limited number of markets,<br />

all driven by FITs. Germany, Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic account for over 60% of<br />

global capacity (Figure 3.1). About half of global capacity is in Germany alone.<br />

Generous incentives, inconsistent with declining PV costs, have been and still are available<br />

in several countries. This has encouraged intermediaries to appear in the PV development<br />

business, since projects allow for relatively high returns. Final investors harnessed<br />

reasonable returns, while intermediaries captured excessive rewards. While the market<br />

recognised how PV costs have been dropping sharply, regulation often did not follow<br />

a similar path. Potential market changes were not considered at the start and remuneration<br />

levels remained too high.<br />

Difficulties began in Spain in 2008, when installed capacity reached 4 GW, almost<br />

10 times more than the official target at that time. Since 2009 drastic future PV<br />

remuneration cuts have been enforced (-70% of 2008 tariffs), further reductions<br />

programmed, and what industry claims as retroactive regulation applied. 3 Also relatively<br />

high new targets are defined for 2020 (8.4 GW). These adjustments have undermined<br />

investors’ confidence.<br />

In Italy, PV accelerated in 2010, with 3.1 GW cumulative capacities in 2010 and 4 GW<br />

awaiting connection, according to GSE, the public renewables institution. If all this capacity<br />

is connected, 87% of the 2020 targets will be met already by 2011. The Czech Republic and<br />

France have experienced similar unexpected outcomes. Greece may be next, with one of the<br />

most generous FITs in Europe, very good sunshine, and more than 5.3 GW of applications<br />

for PV capacities towards a 2020 target of 2.2 GW. A target of 10 GW by 2025 was set in<br />

early September 2011, mostly for exports to Germany. Last but not least, in Germany, where<br />

some 8.5 GW were installed in 2010, the growth rate still exceeds that which would be<br />

consistent with the 2020 targets (about 3.6 GW/y).<br />

The German FIT, after several revisions and adjustments, is probably the most sophisticated<br />

to date. In 2008 a “corridor system” was introduced that ties the rate of regression in support<br />

level to the recent rate of investments. Despite this, three non-scheduled decreases in support<br />

levels were introduced in 2010 and 2011. They have considerably helped keep the FIT<br />

levels – more precisely, the net present value of all future payments – quite close to actual<br />

PV costs in Germany (Figure 10.4), which due to market maturity are significantly lower than<br />

in sunnier countries. It remains to be seen, however, whether both scheduled and nonscheduled<br />

tariff decreases have provided German policy makers with the greater level of<br />

control on total costs passed on to electricity end-users they were seeking. The most recent<br />

information is encouraging, as PV systems commissioned between March and May 2011 in<br />

Germany were about 700 MW, likely to lead to a yearly increase of 2.8 GW, much closer to<br />

target than in 2010.<br />

Cost control appears especially difficult in the case of PV. PV is extremely modular, easy and<br />

fast to install and accessible to the general public. 288 000 installations of less than 100 kWp<br />

were installed in Germany over 12 months (Figure 10.5) – almost three times the cumulative<br />

3. The number of full-capacity hours at which the tariff is paid was limited. Investors having PV systems that are oversized in relation<br />

to their rated and contractual capacities are likely to be hardest hit.<br />

182<br />

© OECD/<strong>IEA</strong>, 2011

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