OECD Culture and Local Development.pdf - PACA
OECD Culture and Local Development.pdf - PACA
OECD Culture and Local Development.pdf - PACA
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
3. PROMOTING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT BY CREATING CULTURAL PRODUCTS<br />
cohesive, <strong>and</strong> satisfy the desired objectives. They will also try to prevent situations<br />
where the pursuit of private interests or rent seeking would be detrimental to the<br />
partnership as a whole. The partners will try to achieve a desirable equilibrium<br />
through “positive attitudes” <strong>and</strong> they will see to it that those attitudes are fostered,<br />
disseminated, copied <strong>and</strong> maintained. If the partnership is to last, four conditions<br />
must be satisfied:<br />
• In a repeated “game”, the partners have an interest in acting on the basis of<br />
positive attitudes <strong>and</strong> in behaving in such a way as to inspire positive behaviour<br />
on the part of the others: this is the “reputation condition”. The partnership is<br />
viable only between players who regard each other’s reputations as good. This<br />
implies a dense information system, without which there is the probability<br />
that negative attitudes will win out over positive attitudes, inevitably causing<br />
the partnership to weaken or collapse. The appellation d’origine contrôlée is a means<br />
of regulating the organisation (<strong>and</strong> sanctioning) of this information, but for<br />
territories such as industrial districts that cannot organise it, other systems, such<br />
as the label, must be used.<br />
• With repetition of the “games”, participants must know that if they misbehave<br />
today they risk being punished tomorrow by losing their rights to the label: this<br />
is the “reprisals condition”. The difficulty is that reprisals, even if properly<br />
organised, may be impossible to enforce. In some cases, firms may no longer<br />
behave as required because their operating conditions do not permit it.<br />
Counselling or financial support from the partners may help them do so. The<br />
history of cultural <strong>and</strong> creative districts provides examples of such mechanisms,<br />
in varying degrees of formality. It also demonstrates the importance of cultural,<br />
ethnic <strong>and</strong> religious factors in the way certain districts function. But in an<br />
atmosphere where individualism reigns supreme, as is often the case in artistic<br />
circles, such arrangements are unlikely to be accepted spontaneously.<br />
• Existing players may upset the initial equilibrium over time, as their size or their<br />
market fluctuates. Interactions will then become less r<strong>and</strong>om, but will take<br />
place through alliances <strong>and</strong> counter-alliances. There is nothing to guarantee that<br />
such alliances will not work against the viability of the district. Thus, we have<br />
a “proper segmentation” condition. The divisions that may appear must not<br />
interrupt the invisible exchanges <strong>and</strong> the networks of trust that were built up<br />
over time. A segmentation that is not necessarily harmful might occur in training<br />
mechanisms, where some for example want to replace specialised initial training<br />
with on-the-job training. There is disagreement, but it does not bear on<br />
objectives, merely on the means for achieving them. A harmful segmentation<br />
might emerge when some partners want to revise product quality <strong>and</strong> labelling<br />
systems to accommodate larger-scale operations, while others insist on<br />
maintaining small-scale “craft” production methods.<br />
CULTURE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - ISBN 92-64-00990-6 - © <strong>OECD</strong> 2005 121