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NOTES
58. Economic spin-offs are estimated at 625 francs per spectator in 1995. Taking the known average visitor
stay of 2.5 days, and the 85,000 tickets sold, we assume a visitor will attend two shows a day, which
yields a total of 17,000 (85,000/5) spectators, and total spending of some 10.6 million francs (including
ticket sales).
59. The Berlin Festival, the Berlinade, is another of the most important international film festivals, drawing
400,000 spectators. Monetary spin-offs for the city are estimated at some €30 million, including €9
million in tax revenues. The spin-offs from this Festival are spread more widely than those from
Cannes, in the sense that Berlin is a huge city and is much more of a mass tourism centre than Cannes.
60. For example, in 1997 the Basel Fair was emptied after its first day as visitors flocked to the Venice
Biennial, which opened the next day.
61. 20% of visitors to Documenta are foreign, and they generate 98,000 bed-nights.
62. Origet du Cluzeau, Cl. (1998), Le tourisme culturel, Paris: PUF, pp.4-6.
63. Viel A. & A. Nivart (2004), “Quand les parcs se font culture”, Conférence à l’École Nationale du
Patrimoine, Paris: 3 Mars, p.7
64. A good example is the debate over “pollution rights”.
65 . Colbert (F) – Boisvert (JM) : Etude de certaines dimensions économiques des activités à caractère culturel : le cas de
l’orchestre symphonique de Montréal, du musée des beaux-arts de Montréal et du festival international de jazz de Montréal,
City of Montréal (CIDEM-Tourism) and Quebec Ministry of Cultural Affairs, May, 1985.
66. Another concept could come into play here as a constraint: that of non-cultural demand for cultural
services. Non-heritage businesses may insist that cultural services be offered, because they benefit
from the spin-offs. They do not consume these services, but they derive benefits from others’
consumption. The entire tourism industry relies on this principle. This demand by businesses has a
very original aspect. The prices they are willing to pay will have to rise as cultural consumption rises,
producing thereby a positive “quantity-price” relationship that translates into a causality that is the
reverse of traditional demand behaviour. A second characteristic is that this demand will only appear
beyond a certain threshold of cultural consumption, i.e. at the point where a change in the number of
consumers unleashes a positive change in their activity. The problem, of course, is that these businesses
will not necessarily make the required investments, and will merely act as stakeholders or pressure
groups. As taxpayers, these firms will expect the government or the municipality to find ways to meet
cultural needs. Local or national policymakers indeed have a tendency to meet such needs, even if
they will recuperate a portion of the investment through taxes. In some cases, these firms will state
their demands to the private owners of cultural goods, and may even enter into a partnership with these
owners, by pooling services for example. But the most frequent response is to organize pressure
groups to lobby government. Seeing themselves as taxpayers, cultural businesses consider they have
already paied their dues for such facilities. Moreover, some members of the group may behave as “free
riders”: they will not reveal any particular preference, since this might increase their expected
contribution, but they will hope that others will reveal their preferences and be willing to pay for them.
67. Greffe (2000), La gestion du patrimoine culturel, op. cit., pp. 104 and ff.
68. Supporters of this reasoning will invoke heritage sites and museums for two reasons: they are generally
permanent in nature, which avoids the problem of temporary consumption; there may be some doubt
about the consumption motive, whereas this will be less true in other situations such as attendance
at a concert.
CULTURE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - ISBN 92-64-00990-6 - © OECD 2005 193