epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

2. ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY
2.1. BASIC CONCEPTS
The IAEA has conducted an examination of past radiation emergencies to identify lessons that
should be considered in the future. Answering the following two questions concerning severe
accidents can provide the most important lessons:
(1) Why, as a result of the Chernobyl release, did 1000 or more children suffer from thyroid
cancer that could have been easily avoided?
(2) Why were actions of the operators partly the cause of the melting of the core during the
accident at Three Mile Island?
The answer to the first question is that the authorities under-reacted because of lack of
preparedness. The answer to the second question is that the operators were not trained for the
conditions they faced. In both cases, the basic cause was that no one thought it was worth
preparing in advance for such low probability emergencies.
This publication was developed after considering such questions.
Preparing for radiation emergencies has often been done in isolation without the full
involvement of the national or local organizations responsible for responding to conventional
emergencies such as fires, floods, or storms. However, these organizations play a crucial role
during a radiation emergency. Moreover, an emergency may involve criminal activity such as
terrorism or theft, in which case emergency response must be co-ordinated with criminal
investigation and possible tactical response. Many emergency plans do not consider this
possibility. This lack of prior planning in co-operation with law enforcement agencies and
other response organizations has caused confusion and reduced the effectiveness of response.
Consequently, radiological and non-radiological planning should be fully integrated.
In the past, responses to emergencies have often been directed by many different
organizations and individuals (at the same time) located throughout the State. Obviously, this
resulted in confusion, conflicting information and instructions, and ultimately in ineffective
response and loss of public trust. Consequently, each State should develop an integrated
response system with responsibilities and authorities clearly assigned and co-ordinated. The
response should be directed from a central location near the scene as soon as possible.
All radiation emergencies perceived as dangerous receive an immense amount of media,
public and political attention. In general, it is not the actual risk that attracts this attention but
the perceived risk. Slow, non-informative and unco-ordinated response by officials and
operators to this media and public attention has resulted in confusion during the response, and
in psychological, economic, and political damage. Since the media are often the primary
source of public information during an emergency, provisions should be in place to respond to
public and the media concerns effectively during an actual radiation emergency or if an event
is perceived by the public or media as a radiation emergency.
The response to a radiation emergency is basically the same as the response to any emergency
involving hazardous material. The major difference is that in many hazardous material
emergencies, the hazard can be smelled, seen or felt. This is not the case with radiation
emergencies. In addition, in most cases responders will have no experience with radiation
emergencies (which are very rare), very small amounts of radioactive material and radiation
(unlike many chemicals) can be immediately detected with simple, commonly available
instruments, and the medical symptoms of radiation exposure (except in extreme cases) will
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